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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to determine the current political and cultural relationship 
that exists between Northern Ireland and Scotland following the Scottish 
independence referendum. It utilises semi-structured interviews conducted with 
senior Northern Irish political elites from across the political spectrum to examine 
their perceptions not only with regard to the referendum but also in relation to the 
institutional and non-institutional links that exist between both countries, the aim 
being to discover how politically significant these connections currently are. The 
research focused initially on the interaction of Northern Ireland’s politicians with the 
referendum and centred on their approaches to the campaign and reactions to the 
result. It then examined in turn the perceptions of political elites to matters such as 
inter-governmental relations, policy making and issues of culture and identity. 
Overall, the study finds that there is resonance of such connections for politicians in 
Northern Ireland yet due to the entrenched ethno-centric nature of politics in the 
region, they attach little political significance to such links. Therefore, the key 
recommendation for this study is that if these ties between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland are to be explored and developed, then it is proposed that civil society 
organisations rather than the political elite be the ones to engage in such a project.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Background and context  
On Thursday 18th September 2014 the people of Scotland were asked ‘should 
Scotland be an independent country?’ Their decision to reject independence by a 
margin of 55% to 44% (Cairney, 2015) was met by a collective sigh of unionist relief. 
Ultimately, the eleventh-hour attempts by British unionists to offer a form of ‘devo-
max’ to the Scots as an alternative to full independence saw them victorious (Trench, 
2014) yet simultaneously, in the eyes of nationalists the relative closeness of the 
vote also provided a certain amount of hope. Therefore, rather than settling the issue 
of Scottish independence for at least a generation, there is a consensus that the 
referendum has in fact generated more questions than answers and the future of the 
Union continues to be uncertain (Cairney, 2015; Jeffery, 2015; Keating, 2015). 
Indeed, a second independence referendum remains on the political agenda of the 
Scottish National Party (SNP) (ibid). As a significant event in United Kingdom (UK) 
politics, the referendum had the potential to affect all of its constituent nations 
regardless of the outcome. In the context of the possible significant connections that 
exist between Scotland and Northern Ireland, the purpose of this study is to discover 
whether this event did indeed resonate with Northern Ireland and in particular with 
the region’s politicians whilst simultaneously providing a closer examination of the 
current political and cultural relationship which exists between the two countries.  
The Scottish independence referendum had profound implications for Northern 
Ireland given its potential for stimulating nationalism across the UK. Cartrite, (2012) 
for instance argues that Scottish secession would have impacted on Ulster more 
than anywhere else in the UK. Although this would have been felt more acutely 
within the unionist community, the inherent ethnic polarisation of Northern Irish 
politics and wider society meant that the potential for any stimulation of Irish 
nationalism either during or following the referendum could also have proved and 
may yet prove to be problematic for the province. Moreover, the coincidence of the 
timing of the referendum alongside numerous political crises in the region (the 
impasse on welfare reform and the failure of the Haass initiative) had the potential to 
further destabilise the region (Bell, 2014; Bradbury, 2015; Trench, 2014). Further, an 
increasingly Anglo-centric aspect to UK devolution following potential Scottish 
independence may have led to further isolation for Northern Ireland (Cumbers, 2014; 
Jeffery, 2015; Keating, 2014) and any resulting rise in English nationalism could 
have prompted a backlash against the remaining Celtic nations in as much as the 
English may not have wished to continue to support them (Cartrite, 2012). This 
remains particularly pertinent for Northern Ireland as they are deemed by many to 
benefit substantially from the current devolutionary arrangements and the Barnett 
Formula in particular (see for instance Bell, 2015; McLean, 2000; Midwinter, 2000).  
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Despite the numerous and significant implications of potential Scottish secession, 
Northern Ireland became marginalised in relation to the referendum. Indeed, aside 
from an initial exchange of views by Lord Empey and Martin McGuiness to affirm the 
unionist and nationalist positions on Scottish independence at the outset of the 
referendum launch, (Bell, 2014) Northern Ireland’s political involvement in the 
referendum campaign and wider debate was minimal (Bell, 2014; Bradbury, 2015; 
Keating, 2014). This was largely due to their deliberate exclusion from both the Yes 
Scotland and the Better Together campaigns (Bradbury, 2015; Keating, 2014) who 
wished to promote a modern and multicultural vision of Scotland and thus 
disassociate with Northern Ireland’s entrenched sectarian politics. Some involvement 
occurred in the form of support from Northern Ireland’s Orange Order towards the 
latter stage of the referendum campaign but this was much diluted as their 
counterparts in Scotland had also been excluded from the Better Together campaign 
(Keating, 2014) and had thus formed their own group ‘British Together’ (McKillop, 
2014). All politicians in Northern Ireland were mindful that any overt political 
interference in the referendum would be unhelpful to their counterparts on either side 
of the campaign and thus were largely satisfied for the democratic nature of the 
referendum to play out and for the Scots to determine their own future. This 
approach also applied to Sinn Féin whose Nationalist aspirations were not the same 
as those advanced by those in the ‘yes’ campaign (Bradbury, 2015) and who 
appeared to be aware that their ‘divisive associations’ would not be helpful to the 
cause of the SNP  (Bell, 2014).   
The majority of political comment and media discussion at the time of the 
referendum and in the immediate aftermath appeared to focus primarily on the effect 
the vote would have on England. This myopia was also replicated within academia 
where the predominance of the English votes for English laws (EVEL) debate that 
occurred throughout the referendum campaign prompted a significant proportion of 
scholarly attention (see Hayton, 2015; Hazell, 2006; Hazell & Sandford, 2015; 
McLean, Gallagher & Lodge, 2013 amongst others). Understandably, some scholars 
focused exclusively on the likely effect the referendum would have on Scotland itself 
(see Keating, 2015). Cairney (2015) for instance discussed the implications of new 
powers for Scotland following the referendum result. He does however advocate the 
use of Scotland as an example by which to stimulate comparative research amongst 
regions with similar secessionist tendencies yet this is largely taken up by scholars 
with a focus on Europe (see for example Dardanelli & Mitchell, 2014; Lineira & Cetra, 
2015). Equally, comparisons are drawn between Scotland and Wales due to the 
similarities in their respective devolutionary arrangements with the latter also 
featuring relatively frequently in the literature alongside England and Scotland (see 
for example Henderson, Jeffery & Lineira, 2015). Northern Ireland, although 
mentioned somewhat briefly by some almost as an afterthought to justify a UK-wide 
perspective was largely overlooked.  
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This significant lack of enquiry is lamentable given the broad yet complex and 
intricate relationship that exists between Northern Ireland and Scotland in terms of 
geography, history, politics and culture. As Walker (2010) argues that historically, the 
influence of the Northern Irish example of devolution on Scottish debates has been 
hitherto overlooked, so contemporary questions regarding Scotland’s secession from 
the Union largely failed to adequately examine and assess the impact that such a 
phenomenon would have on Northern Ireland. That said, it is widely acknowledged 
that the nature of post-devolution politics in Northern Ireland holds a unique position 
in the wider context of UK politics (see for example Shirlow, 2001). Fundamental 
differences in the purpose and implementation of the devolution arrangements which 
exist alongside a marked level of incongruence between Northern Irish and British 
state-wide parties immediately set it apart from other constituent nations of the UK 
(Birrell, 2010; Coakley, 2011; Knox & Carmichael, 2010, Shirlow, 2001). This has 
prompted Jeffery’s (2009, p.299) observation that Northern Ireland has ‘an entirely 
distinctive local party system and a form of proportional government which in 
principle favours a politics of localism rather than engagement with the wider issues 
at play in UK politics’. As a result a large proportion of scholars view the region as an 
exception or an anomaly which is difficult to quantify within a UK-wide perspective 
(Bogdanor, 2010; Cartrite, 2012; Knox & Carmichael, 2010; Paterson, 2002). 
Therefore the wider literature concerned with devolution and constitution exhibits a 
predominantly British focus.  
Where there was discussion on Northern Ireland, there appeared to be agreement 
that the referendum result had only a minimal impact on the region. Bradbury, (2015) 
argues that this was due to their exclusion from the campaign and wider debate. 
Politically, he states that the effects of the renewed debate on devolution which 
followed the ‘no’ vote merely resulted in more talks for Northern Ireland which aimed 
to address legacy issues as well as the budget. An extra 2 billion pounds were 
supplied by the UK government to solve welfare problems and talks ultimately led to 
the Stormont House Agreement which was signed by all parties in December 2014 
(Bradbury, 2015, p.16). Trench (2014) largely concurs, highlighting the fact that 
plans to devolve corporation tax to Northern Ireland were shelved until the Executive 
resumed normal function. As a result Trench (2014) sees resolving the impasse over 
welfare reform as being the most pressing concern for Northern Ireland following the 
referendum. Jeffery (2015) is sensitive to the fact that constitutional debates were 
also occurring in Wales and Northern Ireland at the time of the referendum. He 
argues that a complex and unpredictable ‘constitutional chain reaction’ has ensued 
from the referendum which may spill over into other regions of the UK. However, he 
sees any future threat to the Union as being likely to originate in Scotland particularly 
if the pro-independence momentum is maintained by increasing support for the SNP 
and the decline of Scottish Labour. Cartrite (2012) is also clear that any stimulation 
of nationalism which would result from the referendum would apply primarily to 
Scotland and Wales and not Northern Ireland and that a ‘no’ result which involves 
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anything less than ‘devo-max’ would have minimal impact on both unionists and 
nationalists in the province. She also finds that ‘the holding of the Scottish 
referendum would have little or no demonstration effect in Northern Ireland’ (Cartrite, 
2012, p.527).This would be true for both unionists and nationalists and as such she 
argues that their dichotomous relationship would be unlikely to change. 
Wood (2014) argues that there has been little consideration afforded to the issue of 
culture and identity following the referendum either in Scotland or the rest of Britain. 
This stemmed from ‘an underlying sense that a ‘no’ vote was inevitable or that if, on 
the off-chance that independence did occur, this would not affect the rest of Britain’ 
(ibid, p.40). Several scholars highlight the connection of unionists to Scotland by 
means of their Ulster-Scots identity, a link which has arguably taken on an increased 
political significance since the GFA in 1998 (Bell, 2014; Cartrite, 2012). In terms of its 
significance to the referendum, Bell, (2014) points out that ‘culturally, the Northern 
Irish Protestants and unionists revere their Scottish ancestry and connections and 
look to Scotland as their kin.’ This view is also shared by Keating (2014) who argues 
that the loyalty of unionists ‘to their kith and kin in Western Scotland, and shared 
cultural and religious conditions’ is equal only to that shown to the Queen. He also 
highlights the historical significance of the link between western Scotland and 
Northern Ireland which for hundreds of years has been ‘one social space, with only a 
few miles of sea between them’ (Keating, 2014). Both scholars agree that a potential 
‘yes’ vote would have had a significant negative impact on unionists in Northern 
Ireland and could have resulted in a further diminution of their Britishness (Cartrite, 
2012). 
Conceptual Framework 
The starting point of this project was the imbalance noted above in media and 
academic discussion of the referendum. An extensive review of the literature 
identified a range of possible connections between Northern Ireland and Scotland, 
both institutional and cultural which suggested that an examination of ties between 
different parts of the UK which did not start with England as a baseline was 
worthwhile. However, there were also gaps in the literature and much information 
had to be intuited from separate bodies of writing about both Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. Crucially, there was a distinct dearth of significant literature which 
examined either the current political or cultural relationship between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland or which evaluated the relative significance of any potential links. 
In order to collect some original primary data that could allow for analysis of these 
possible ‘ties that bind’, representatives of political parties sitting in the Northern 
Ireland Assembly at the time of the 2014 referendum were approached for interview. 
These party political elites were chosen because they were most likely to have 
relevant experience of the institutional links resulting from devolution and the wider 
UK framework of governance. As representatives of political unionism and 
 5 
 
nationalism, as well as non-aligned parties, their perspectives would reflect some of 
the key dynamics of politics and identity in Northern Ireland and so would allow for 
the observation of any emotional resonance of connections with Scotland as well as 
provide insight into formal political connections. 
After reviewing relevant literature, the information gleaned from current academic 
discussion led to the formulation of three research questions which could be 
answered through the chosen methodology of qualitative semi-structured interviews. 
These were: 
1. What do reactions to the referendum highlight about how unionist, nationalist 
and non-aligned political perspectives interact with political developments in 
Scotland? 
2. How significant are formal party, institutional and policy links between 
Scotland and Northern Ireland for Northern Ireland’s politicians? 
3. How significant are cultural links and connections between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland for Northern Ireland’s politicians? 
Aims and objectives 
By bringing academic discussion on the subject of Scotland and Northern Ireland’s 
relationship together and collecting and analysing primary data, this project has been 
designed to make an original contribution to this under-researched area of national 
identity and multi-level politics in the UK. To do this the following set of aims and 
objectives were devised. 
Aims: 
1. To gain an understanding of the political dynamics of the UK from a less 
Anglo-centric perspective. 
2. To develop a critical overview of possible connections between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland and their contemporary resonance. 
3. To contribute to knowledge by addressing an under-researched element of 
identity and politics in the UK. 
Objectives: 
1. To create a qualitative research project that provides knowledge on the 
significance of Scotland to contemporary Northern Irish politics. 
2. To explore perceptions and perspectives from unionist, nationalist and non-
aligned politicians in the context of the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum. 
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3. To make recommendations for the study of devolution in the UK from a 
marginalised perspective. 
 
 
Guide to the thesis 
The literature review follows this chapter followed by chapter three which outlines the 
methodology underpinning the project. The thesis then looks systematically at the 
possible significant links between Scotland and Northern Ireland which were 
identified in the literature review and carries out an analysis of the primary data. The 
final chapter containing the conclusion of the thesis sets out the answers to the 
research questions and the findings of the project. It then finishes with reflections on 
avenues for further research.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Issues of sub-state nationalism in the UK and the impact of devolution have been 
subjects of extensive academic research in both Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
However, as outlined in the introduction direct comparisons are much rarer, in part 
because of the difficulties of the dynamics of conflict in Northern Ireland and its 
distinctive system. Despite this, some important work that makes direct comparisons, 
particularly in terms of historical and cultural ties, has been produced and it is also 
possible to identify potential connections from bodies of literature that concentrate on 
Scotland and Northern Ireland alone, or which assess the impact of devolution 
across the UK. 
In order to provide a comprehensive overview of relevant academic discussion, this 
review has been organised to explore potential connections and their relative 
significance. These themes will be split into two primary sets of links, one political 
and institutional in nature and one that focuses on familial and cultural links. The 
meaning and resonance of these connections will be explored and it will be shown 
that they do have potential significance in terms of both identity and policy, 
something that will then be explored with analysis of the semi-structured interviews 
collected for the project. The review will conclude with a discussion of the gaps in the 
literature which this project has been designed to address in order to make a 
contribution to knowledge on this subject. 
Political and Institutional Links  
The implementation of Devolution 
It is widely held that the introduction of devolution to the UK promised ‘new 
institutions, new processes and a new political culture’ (Mitchell, 2000, p.605) and 
became described as an era of ‘new politics’ in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland (Bradbury & Mitchell, 2001). This would be based on a more consensual 
style of politics in Scotland and a consociational agreement in Northern Ireland which 
required cooperation between all parties in government in order to be able to move 
forward. The second hope was for policy innovation. Expectations for Scotland were 
high in this regard in that ‘innovation in institutional procedures would bring about a 
more open and collaborative style of decision making and produce distinctive policy 
outcomes’ (see also Mitchell, 1998, 2000). Rather less was expected in Northern 
Ireland although it was hoped that in time the policy framework would become much 
less dependent on the UK (Bradbury & Mitchell, 2001, p.257, see also Jeffery, 2009).  
The fundamental difference in the origins of the political systems of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland is highlighted by Jeffery (2009) who points out that Scottish 
devolution arose from over 10 years of campaigning of the Constitutional 
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Convention, a group which consisted of a broad mix of political parties (Labour, the 
Liberal Democrats and to a lesser extent, the SNP) and civil bodies such as the 
church, trade unions and academics. All were unhappy at being represented by a 
largely remote and ‘unresponsive’ Westminster which was seen as being at odds 
with Scottish national identity and as such they wished to assert their ‘claim of right’ 
from the wider representation of the UK constitution (Jeffery, 2009, p.292/3). In 
contrast, devolution in Northern Ireland stemmed from the peace process and 
involved a series of ‘initiatives designed to pacify conflict in a divided society’ the 
main aim of devolution being to provide political stability ‘to contain inter-communal 
conflict between pro-British Protestants and pro-Irish Catholics’, avoid direct rule and 
encourage and nurture cooperation between the North and South of Ireland (Jeffery, 
2009, p.294). He argues that there are certain similarities in terms of powers 
between Scotland and Northern Ireland but ultimately the fundamental difference is 
that devolution in Northern Ireland is based on a consociational form of governance 
which relies on power-sharing and is therefore dependent on agreement between 
political parties. (For a discussion of consociationalism please see Taylor, (2009) 
and also Horowitz, (2002)). 
The ‘success’ of devolution is the subject of much continuing debate. However, there 
appears to be a general consensus that particularly in the early stages of devolution, 
expectations were unrealistically high and were therefore not met. Indeed, according 
to Mitchell (2000) the very concept of ‘new politics’ has not been adequately defined 
from the outset (see also Bennie, Denver, Mitchell & Bradbury, 2001). Bradbury & 
Mitchell (2001, p.257)  argue that in the early years of devolution ‘evidence of new 
politics is limited’ with animosity between parties in both nations leading to little in the 
way of consensus. Indeed, they describe devolution in Northern Ireland as a 
‘paradox’ which has ‘strengthened the extremes’ leading them to conclude that the 
consociational system has delivered peace to the region but does not accommodate 
‘normal politics’ (Bradbury & Mitchell, 2001, p.267). Essentially it has cemented the 
polarised nature of politics in Northern Ireland. The lack of consensus amongst elites 
is therefore problematic and leads Bradbury & Mitchell (2001) to advance a largely 
negative appraisal of devolution in the early years. Moreover, the lack of agreement 
between Northern Ireland’s political parties meant that failure was a real possibility 
and the frequent suspensions of devolution reflect its ‘shaky existence’ (Bradbury & 
Mitchell, (2001, p.268) and see also Mitchell & Bradbury, 2004; Jeffery, 2009).  
More recently, the literature appears to suggest that there has been a shift towards a 
more consensual-style approach to policy making in Scotland (Birrell & Heenan, 
2013 and see also Cairney, 2008; Keating et al, 2009). However, most scholars 
agree that the consociational nature of politics in Northern Ireland continue to 
hamper the progress of the region in terms of effective policy making. Indeed, the 
election of the DUP and Sinn Féin in 2007 as the two largest unionist and nationalist 
parties lies at the heart of the current political instability in Northern Ireland (Birrell & 
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Heenan, 2013; Gray & Birrell, 2012; Horgan & Gray, 2012). Bradbury (2015) for 
example describes the current political arrangements as being ‘not amenable to 
either party’ given that they occupy the extreme right and left respectively of the 
political spectrum and remains problematic ‘while each fights hard for political 
ascendency to win the long term battle of hearts and minds for a united Ireland on 
one side and continued union with the rest of the UK on the other’ (Bradbury, 2015, 
p.12). As a result, he states that ‘Northern Irish devolution has developed on the 
basis of the politics of a stable instability’ (ibid). 
Party and Inter-governmental Connections  
Most scholars agree that inter-governmental relations (IGR) in the UK are conducted 
largely on an informal and ad hoc basis (Jeffery, 2009; Swenden & McEwen, 2014; 
Trench, 2014). With the exception of Birrell, (2012) there is a distinct dearth of 
significant literature which examines IGR in Northern Ireland and to date there has 
been no attempt to evaluate the extent of IGR between the province and Scotland 
following the Scottish independence referendum. Perhaps the main reason for this 
glaring omission lies in the fact that Northern Ireland presents as a unique case in 
terms of UK IGR as under the terms of The 1998 Agreement, the government of 
Northern Ireland relates to both the British and Irish governments (Birrell, 2012; 
Swenden & McEwen, 2014). In addition, as IGR under the prolonged period of Direct 
Rule was largely minimal (see also Horgan, 2003), the new institutions that were set 
up following The Agreement, whilst playing an important role in proceedings also 
meant that a period of transition was required for them to become sufficiently 
embedded in. However, as the early years of devolution were marked by numerous 
break downs and suspensions, developing IGR was low on the Executive’s priority 
list. As a result Birrell (2012) argues that IGR is of more symbolic importance to 
parties in Northern Ireland rather than the outcomes they achieve.  
There is also a general consensus that the issue of political incongruence has 
become increasingly salient with regards to UK IGR following the devolved elections 
of 2007 (Birrell, 2012; Jeffery, 2009; Swenden & McEwen, 2014). Indeed, following 
the election of an SNP majority government in Scotland, Labour minority in Wales, a 
cross-party coalition of five in Northern Ireland and a Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition in Westminster at the 2010 General Election, this represented full party 
incongruence at all levels (Swenden & McEwen, 2014, p.490/1). Many argue that 
such incongruence has thrown into relief the underdeveloped nature of UK IGR and 
its ability to facilitate and resolve potential disputes between constituent nations 
(Jeffery, 2009; Swenden & McEwen, 2014). Whilst efforts to institutionalise IGR were 
made by the new SNP government in Scotland, institutional bodies such as the 
British-Irish Council (BIC) and the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) are still 
regarded as being largely under-used (see Coakley, 2014; Jeffery, 2009). This has 
led many scholars to argue that a more formal approach to UK IGR is needed to be 
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able to cope with the increasing demands of devolution and the potential for 
territorial disputes (Jeffery, 2009; Swenden & McEwen, 2014; Trench, 2014).   
According to Birrell, (2012, p.282) the uniqueness of the party system in Northern 
Ireland represents permanent political incongruence with both centre and periphery 
relationships. Moreover, as incongruence is expected with a UK government, parties 
in Northern Ireland have traditionally been unconcerned with the political composition 
of the Westminster government (ibid). Another problem presents in that due to the 
consociational nature of power-sharing in the region, representation of Northern 
Ireland in IGR is multi-party and therefore will always be represented by unionists 
and nationalists (and more recently the Alliance Party) so the potential for disputes in 
IGR arenas is always present. This, accordingly to Birrell, (2012, p.270) presents an 
additional problem in that ‘the context of deep ideological and historic cleavages 
between parties has a major influence on attitudes towards IGR’. He argues that 
whilst nationalists have become increasingly involved in IGR following devolution 
and consent to participate in fora such as the BIC, unionist parties (particularly the 
DUP and UUP) remain suspicious of North/South bodies such as the North-South 
Ministerial Council (NSMC). Incongruence is therefore present and potentially 
problematic at all levels of IGR in Northern Ireland (Birrell, 2012).  
The British-Irish Council (BIC)  
The intergovernmental body of the BIC originated from strand three of The 
Agreement and was designed to reassure unionists of their links to Britain yet also 
placate their desire to counterbalance the North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC) 
with a body firmly rooted in British rather than Irish foundations (Birrell, 2012; 
Bogdanor, 1999; Fanning, 2005). Essentially, the ‘Council of the Isles’ as unionists 
preferred to term it, placed the future relationship between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland within a ‘British Isles context’ (Lynch & Hopkins, 2001, p.753). 
Swenden & McEwen (2014) argue that the BIC provides greater scope than other 
bodies such as the JMC in that it represents UK wide interests by bringing together 
the UK, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish governments as well as representatives 
from Ireland, the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey. This somewhat neutral character 
of the BIC is therefore deemed acceptable to both Northern Irish unionists and 
nationalists (Birrell, 2012). Officially, its role is ‘to promote the harmonious and 
mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the people of 
these islands’ (Bogdanor, 1999, p.288; Nolan, 2012, p.132) the intention being to 
create a forum for cooperation and exchange of ideas in an East-West setting of 
governance (Birrell, 2012; Lynch & Hopkins, 2001). Indeed, it was thought the BIC 
may play an important role in future relations between all nations in the UK (Mitchell, 
2000, p.74).  
Most scholars agree that the initial progress of the BIC was slow (Bogdanor, 1999; 
Coakley, 2014; Lynch & Hopkins, 2001) and had been hampered by suspension 
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(Fanning, 2005). However, some concede that its output has improved albeit 
modestly with summits and regular meetings being held both at ministerial and 
administrative level and more importantly, being well attended by all constituent 
members (Birrell, 2012; Coakley, 2014; Swenden & McEwen, 2014). On the whole, 
Birrell (2012) paints a largely positive picture of the BIC and argues that overall, it 
has been a success. He highlights the fact that it continued to function throughout 
the period of suspension of the Northern Ireland Executive and notes that following 
their return in 2007 there has been an expansion of work programs and an added 
purpose to proceedings which is reflected in the establishment of permanent 
headquarters of the Council in Edinburgh (Birrell, 2012 and see also Coakley, 2014). 
Indeed, he highlights the UK Child Poverty Act 2010 as having originated in BIC 
meetings and states that most of the intergovernmental agreement from Northern 
Ireland originates in the BIC. Moreover, as he feels that the BIC has not been 
dominated by either the British or Irish governments, Birrell (2012, p.281) argues that 
‘a strong practical policy focus has assisted in avoiding party political ideological 
constraints.’ Birrell’s (2012) largely positive appraisal of the BIC stands in some 
contrast to the views of many scholars. Whilst some concede that the BIC has 
‘facilitated contact’ (Coakley, 2014, p.93) and may well be increasing in scope and 
range, (Swenden & McEwen, 2014, p.496) for many ‘it remains mainly a symbol of 
cooperation and communication rather than co-decision’ (ibid).  
In contrast to Birrell, (2012) Fanning (2005, p.137) interprets the fact that the BIC 
continued to meet during the suspensions of the Northern Irish government as 
Northern Ireland being ‘largely peripheral to the process’ and therefore not a primary 
concern of either the British or Irish governments. He argues that the limitations of 
the BIC are largely institutional but have also been hindered by political factors; the 
most significant being that unionists believed that participation in the BIC would 
generate sympathy for their cause particularly amongst the Scots and the Welsh, as 
Irish nationalists have found in their dealings with the Republic of Ireland in the 
NSMC. This has not transpired and as such he feels that unionists may ultimately 
lose interest in the BIC. Fanning (2005, p.139) also suggests that the fundamental 
and ideological differences between unionists in Northern Ireland and the SNP have 
contributed to this with Scottish nationalism having ‘little to gain and much to lose 
from any identification with Ulster’s unionists’. He goes on to describe the 
relationship between Northern Irish unionists and Scottish and Welsh nationalists as 
being tense and he expects unionists backing for the BIC will quickly dissipate with 
rising nationalism. Fanning (2005, p.141) concludes that ‘the workings of the BIC 
have been incidental, rather than fundamental, to the improvement in the East-West 
intergovernmental relationship.’ Moreover, he argues that none of the other 
participants in the BIC are interested in the defensive, London-oriented position of 
Ulster unionists and therefore concludes that ‘the dynamic for the successful 
functioning of the BIC...derives largely from the enthusiasm and the commitment of 
the devolved governments other than the government of Northern Ireland’ (ibid). 
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Although writing some time before the Northern Ireland Executive was re-established 
in 2007, many of Fanning’s (2005) points particularly with regard to rising Scottish 
nationalism and the relationship dynamic between Northern Irish unionists and the 
SNP, remain salient today. Indeed, as Nolan (2012, p.133) states that ‘the agenda of 
the BIC is of peripheral interest to the main parties-including unionists’, this 
assessment appears to confirm Fanning’s (2005) earlier suggestion that unionists 
may indeed have lost interest in the BIC. As this theory stands in direct contrast to 
that of Birrell, (2012) it will be interesting to discover just how influential the BIC is to 
all Northern Irish parties and whether party political incongruence has become 
increasingly problematic between Scotland and Northern Ireland in terms of IGR 
following the independence referendum.       
Birrell, (2012) states that IGR in Northern Ireland take place in institutional as well as 
informal and ad hoc formats. Thus IGR between Northern Ireland and Scotland is 
conducted both as devolved IGR (which involves the JMC, devolved summits, 
bilateral First Minister meetings, quadrilateral ministerial meetings and trilateral 
ministerial meetings of devolved ministers) and also as East-West IGR in the form of 
the British-Irish Council (BIC). He argues that devolved summits involving the 
leaders of devolved nations are infrequent as are ministerial meetings although more 
recently in times of austerity, meetings between finance ministers have become 
more common. Quadrilateral meetings have taken place on issues such as the 
environment and agriculture and are more common than trilateral meetings of 
devolved ministers. Regular financial quadrilateral meetings now take place (see 
also Swenden & McEwen, 2014). Trilateral meetings of ministers usually have a 
single purpose with the intention of agreeing a position with which to lobby the UK 
government and have also largely focused on economic matters. Birrell, (2012, 
p.275/6) states that the most common form of meeting is bilateral between First 
Ministers and ministerial colleagues but that they are more ‘low key’ and usually 
revolve around specific issues of policy and the exchange of information.   
Swenden & McEwen (2014, p.488) argue that the asymmetrical nature of devolution 
in the UK ‘is conducive to bilateral and weakly institutionalised IGR’ and this has 
perpetuated since 1999. They highlight the existence of multilateral bodies of 
cooperation such as the JMC and the BIC which have become more developed 
since 2007. However, they state that IGR in these bodies is significantly less 
important and frequent than bilateral meetings between the devolved nation and the 
UK government. They do point out that inter-ministerial meetings outside of IGR 
bodies have been conducted since the early years of devolution and particularly in 
times of crisis (Swenden & McEwen, 2014, p.495). Moreover, some ad hoc meetings 
are held albeit infrequently within the ‘Celtic forum’, however their main argument is 
that ‘the asymmetrical distribution of competences, coupled with the distinctive 
political systems and institutions in each case, mean that the devolved 
administrations rarely share common interests that would drive a structure of 
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multilateral coordination on a horizontal basis’ (ibid, p.496). Birrell, (2012, p.281) 
appears to agree that there is a lack of common interest amongst the devolved 
nations and states that ‘joint actions by the devolved leaders are not so common’. 
However, he highlights the fact that in 2010 they issued an ‘unprecedented’ joint 
declaration which opposed the plans of the UK government to cut public spending. 
This was followed up a year later and resulted in a letter being sent to the Chancellor 
regarding the support of economic growth (ibid). This willingness to cooperate to 
oppose the UK government’s austerity measures is acknowledged by Swenden & 
McEwen, (2014) to be the exception to an otherwise lack of common interest. 
Although Birrell, (2012) points out that both the DUP and Sinn Féin have found 
common ground in challenging austerity measures, the lack of common cause 
between devolved nations leads him to conclude that the most significant amount of 
inter-governmental agreement originates from Northern Ireland’s involvement in the 
BIC. These views appear to suggest that aside from some mutual cooperation on 
anti-austerity measures, the scope for IGR between Scotland and Northern Ireland is 
limited. Moreover, there appears to be some disagreement as to the extent of IGR 
conducted in bodies such as the BIC yet, this area remains understudied in the 
context of the referendum and aftermath, a gap that this thesis will seek to address. 
Party political linkage  
Birrell (2012, p.272) highlights the fact that the party system in Northern Ireland is 
‘wholly distinctive’ to that which exists in the rest of the UK as all political parties are 
non-state-wide. One notable exception to this was the unsuccessful attempt by the 
UUP to ally with the Conservative Party in the General Election of 2010 and which is 
unlikely to be repeated (McGlynn, Tonge & McAuley, 2014). The SDLP has a 
‘sisterly link’ with The Labour Party, and Alliance has loose links with the Liberal 
Democrats. Of the two largest parties, the DUP has no formal links with British 
parties and Sinn Féin has no links at all (Birrell, 2012, p.272). This absence of state-
wide parties also largely precludes Northern Ireland from debates on post-devolution 
party strategy as most scholars continue to focus largely on its effects on state-wide 
parties (see for example Bratberg, 2010; Deschouwer, 2003; Dunleavy, 2005; 
Hopkin & Bradbury, 2006; Hough & Jeffery, 2003). Jeffery (2009, p.299) laments the 
continuing focus on state-wide parties across the literature yet acknowledges the 
difficulties which present when extending such debate to Northern Ireland, observing 
that the province has ‘an entirely distinctive local party system and a form of 
proportional government which in principle favours a politics of localism rather than 
engagement with the wider issues at play in UK politics.’   
According to Hepburn & McLoughlin (2011, p.386) Northern Ireland parties are 
rarely, if ever compared to those in Great Britain. They argue that this is largely due 
to the fact that Northern Ireland is seen as ‘a deviant case’ and an exception to wider 
UK politics and as a post-conflict region typified by ethnic cleavage, most scholars 
choose instead to compare Northern Ireland with other conflict regions such as the 
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Basque Country or Palestine. As a result, by examining the strategies of the SNP 
and the SDLP, Hepburn and McLoughlin (2011) make one of the first detailed 
comparisons of party strategy to consider Northern Ireland and which also examines 
strategies between devolved nations of the UK. The study explores how both parties 
have used Europe to advance their own nationalist agendas within the context of 
devolution. They find that both the SNP and SDLP share many similarities in that 
‘they have a social democratic character, and correspondingly have employed a 
liberal and progressive nationalist discourse’. Indeed, as the SNP has advanced 
itself as an inclusive ‘civic nationalist party’, they note that the SDLP also tries to 
promote an inclusive brand of Irish nationalism (Hepburn & McLoughlin, 2011, 
p.392). Historically, both parties have fluctuated in their approaches to Europe, 
unsure as how it would best serve their interests yet largely seeking to utilise the 
framework of the European Union (EU) as a replacement for that of the UK in the 
event that their respective political goals were to become realised. They find that 
more recently, in recognition of increasing Euroscepticism in the UK the SNP has 
slightly altered its position on Europe by becoming increasingly critical of the 
integration project. However, the SDLP has not, remaining very much pro-integration 
despite losing out electorally to their nationalist rivals Sinn Féin who, although 
supporters of the EU are also critical of it; a stance which appears to currently 
resonate with Northern Ireland’s nationalist electorate (ibid). This suggests that there 
are different political trends within the two regions with Scotland perhaps being more 
responsive than Northern Ireland to state-wide events.  
Policy making 
In terms of policy, Bradbury & Mitchell (2001, p.268) identify Scotland as being 
provided with the widest scope of all nations for policy innovation (see also Mitchell, 
1998, 2000). They note that the Scottish parliament ‘was established with novel roles 
for committees-both as policy makers assisting the Executive and as scrutinisers of 
the Executive’. However, they point out that the system was not without initial 
problem as committees required tweaking (due to being insufficiently staffed and 
resourced) and therefore produced a mixed bag of results. Despite describing 
Scottish policy making as being largely successful they argue that the scope for 
policy initiative did not meet initial expectations due to the continued retention of 
some powers at Westminster and the reality of financial constraints. Put simply, lots 
of Scottish policy was generated but most of it was run of the mill. 
In contrast, according to Bradbury & Mitchell (2001, p.273) the lack of consensus in 
Northern Ireland generated little in the way of public policy initiatives in the early 
years of devolution which due to the frequent suspensions of the Executive, 
continued to rely on Westminster. Indeed, they state ‘that a policy deficit existed 
alongside a democratic deficit in Northern Ireland’. However, McGlynn & McAuley 
(2011) identified an early period of distinctive policy making (such as resistance to 
New Labour’s use of markets and private involvement in public services) in the first 
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incarnation of the Assembly. Bradbury & Mitchell (2001, p.274) concede that some 
long-standing issues such as the 11+ exam were finally debated but that the 
progress of devolution in Northern Ireland was slow. That said, the authors consider 
that the ‘move away from paramilitary activity is remarkable’ and that the 
achievement of peace can still be regarded as considerable progress (ibid). 
More recently, the literature appears to suggest that there has been a shift towards a 
more consensual-style approach to policy making in Scotland (Birrell & Heenan, 
2013 and see also Cairney, 2008; Keating et al, 2009). However, there remains a 
lack of literature concerned with policy style in Northern Ireland and in particular with 
regard to policy transfer between Scotland and Northern Ireland (Birrell, 2012; Birrell 
& Heenan, 2013; Gray & Birrell, 2012). Birrell & Heenan (2013) for instance find that 
there is no distinct policy style in Northern Ireland and evidence for consensual 
policy making is limited. They argue that consociationalism continues to constrain 
consensual policy-making and therefore the system in Northern Ireland differs 
markedly from that which exists in Scotland. The authors find that policy impasses 
and ‘unilateral decision making by Ministers’ hamper consensual policy making and 
this has led more generally to poor policy outcomes for Northern Ireland. Similarly, 
Horgan & Gray (2012) writing following the 2011 election identify a ‘silo mentality’ 
where ministers from all parties guard ‘fiefdoms’ acting unilaterally and protecting 
budgets with little inter-departmental cooperation. They describe the composition of 
the Executive and the competing ideologies of the five coalition parties and conclude 
that ‘small wonder that there has been a virtual policy impasse at Stormont since 
2007’ (see also Gray & Birrell, 2012). Indeed, they describe the coalition between the 
DUP and Sinn Féin as ‘unlikely’ and the main reason why effective policy-making is 
difficult (Horgan & Gray, 2012, p.468/9). The authors further state that ‘the principle 
of collective responsibility has been largely absent from policy making and 
implementation in Northern Ireland since devolution’ and conclude that Northern 
Ireland has continued to copy policy from London resulting in a lack of policy of any 
positive significance for the people of Northern Ireland (ibid, p.470). 
Keating & Cairney (2012, p.240) also highlight a lack of literature concerning policy 
learning in devolved nations. They argue that ‘policy transfer in devolved 
systems...can be difficult to identify since there are many reasons why one 
government might adopt policies similar to those being carried out elsewhere , not all 
of which are to do with improving policy performance. Convergence like divergence 
might not even be the result of conscious decisions by policy-makers’. (ibid) The 
extent of policy transfer amongst devolved nations appears to be contested in the 
literature with many scholars highlighting numerous constraints which inhibit its 
development. Keating, Cairney & Hepburn (2012, p.303) for example argue that 
most policy learning is between the peripheries and the centre due to there being 
‘fewer channels and opportunities’ for policy transfer between the peripheries. This 
view appears to be held by many scholars who see the UK system as being 
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conducive to creating policy divergence for three main reasons. Firstly, there are no 
checks on regional policy from Westminster. Secondly, IGR is largely unstructured 
and ad hoc and therefore fosters limited cooperation between regions (Trench, 2005) 
and thirdly, financial constraints limit policy transfer due to inequalities in the Barnett 
formula of funding (Schmuecker & Adams, 2005; Shaw, Mackinnon & Docherty, 
2009 and see also Gallacher & Raffe, 2012). 
By contrast, Birrell (2012, p.310) sees devolution as being conducive to policy 
transfer ‘due to geographical proximity and close institutional relationships’ and 
therefore views the BIC and JMC as playing a role in facilitating policy copying 
between devolved nations. Birrell, (2012, p.310) notes that ‘the process and 
opportunity for policy copying and transfer is more likely to occur when a government 
is making a decision on changes or reforms to an existing system’ and argues that 
during the reform of local government, ‘policy copying has been very selective and 
limited to community planning, standards and relationships with the department’ 
(ibid, p.319). Knox & Carmichael (2015, p.44) note that ‘community planning has 
been in place within local government in England and Wales since 2000 and in 
Scotland from 2003.’ They also state that ‘the experience of Great Britain offers 
significant learning for Northern Ireland’ (ibid). However, the authors make no 
specific link of policy transfer from Scotland to Northern Ireland in terms of 
community planning, instead choosing to focus on the considerable practical 
difficulties of implementing such a system to local government in the region.  
Birrell, (2012) concludes that policy copying in Northern Ireland has been limited 
following devolution with little pressure exerted on elites to engage with it. However, 
he finds that some transfer has occurred between Scotland and Northern Ireland 
most notably in the introduction of the Children’s Commissioner and the 
Commissioner for Older People. He further argues that Unionists are more likely to 
look to Scotland and Wales whilst the SDLP and Sinn Féin are less likely although 
as nationalist parties they tend not to look to the Republic either. Further, ‘in terms of 
terminology, the concepts of policy copying and transfer are rarely used by the 
Northern Ireland polity. Preferred in most narratives is the notion of pursuing, 
maintaining or rejecting parity with, for example, England’ (ibid, p.310). 
Keating et al (2012) appear to concur citing the creation of the Children’s 
commissioner and later the Older People’s Commissioner as examples of policy 
transfer between the two countries. However, they add that all three devolved 
nations are influenced by the Republic of Ireland and particularly Northern Ireland 
which is encouraged to do so by way of strand two of The Agreement. Keating et al 
(2012) conclude that Northern Ireland under direct rule adopted policy from the 
centre yet there have been efforts to look at Scotland, Wales and to Europe for 
policy inspiration particularly in terms of public health, higher education and 
children’s issues. Generally however, like Birrell (2012) they feel that post-devolution 
policy learning is lacklustre and sporadic and laboratories of democracies are yet to 
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emerge. Several scholars highlight further constraints which may be hampering 
policy transfer between Scotland and Northern Ireland.  Mooney, Scott & Williams 
(2006) for instance argue that the retention of certain powers by Westminster limit 
the extent of policy transfer amongst peripheries. They also highlight the fact that 
there are problems specific to each region. They do not mention Northern Ireland 
specifically, but with problems arising from the ‘troubles’ and continuing sectarian 
division particularly in terms of health and welfare, such issues are specific to 
Northern Ireland and will therefore need specific policy (see also Donnelly & 
Osborne, 2005). 
Overall there appears to be some contention across academia as to the 
effectiveness and significance of the institutional links that exist between Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. IGR is seen as being key in improving cooperation between 
both nations and also in facilitating the exchange of ideas yet the role and output of 
fora such as the BIC is disputed. Moreover, an apparent lack of common interest and 
absence of any substantial political linkage between Northern Ireland and the British 
mainland parties suggest that the scope for IGR between Scotland and Northern 
Ireland is limited. Such limitations would also have a negative impact on the potential 
for policy transfer and innovation between the two countries. In the context of this 
study, there appears to be a suggestion from several scholars that Northern Ireland’s 
politicians (both unionist and nationalist) have to date, seemed largely uninterested 
in participating in devolved IGR with Scotland or engaging in any substantial policy 
transfer. This in turn raises questions as to whether the various post-Agreement 
institutions remain merely symbolic as suggested by Birrell, (2012) and Swenden & 
McEwen (2014) and moreover, that the politics of localism may still prevail in 
Northern Ireland (Jeffery, 2009). By examining the perceptions and attitudes of 
Northern Ireland’s politicians to IGR, political linkage and policy making, this study 
will discover the current political significance of the institutional links which exist 
between Scotland and Northern Ireland.     
Cultural and Familial Links  
Migration and family   
Irish emigration has only recently become increasingly well documented in the 
literature (Bradley, 2006). Delaney, (2014, p.128) declares that Irish emigration after 
1600 was ‘the most significant population movement of people in European history’ 
when over 10 million people left the island. This diaspora was diverse in their choice 
of destination settling first in the Americas and the Caribbean and then later in 
Australasia and Africa. Delaney (2014) states that Ulster Presbyterians were the 
‘vanguard’ in the establishment of the first British Empire in North America and 
further mass movement of Ulster Protestants to the ‘new world’ occurred from 17th 
and 18th century Ulster. An exodus of Catholics from the mid 19th century up until the 
First World War then dominates the diaspora when an estimated 8 million Irish 
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emigrated between the Act of Union 1801 and the partition of the island in 1920, the 
key reason for which appears to be the Great Famine in the middle of the 19th 
century.  
MacRaild (2014, p.562) concurs that the 19th century saw mass migration in the form 
of an Irish diaspora but that migration also occurred both before and after this time. 
He notes that there was Ulster migration to the West coast of Scotland at the end of 
the 18th century and states that Ulster featured prominently in pre-modern migration, 
continuing to contribute throughout the 19th century. He calls this migration a ‘trans-
Irish Sea migratory network connecting the industrial regions of Britain with those in 
the north-eastern corner of Ireland’ and that by the end of the 19th century the North 
of England, Ulster and Scotland were connected in ‘an interregional economy’ with 
inter-migration occurring between the three countries (MacRaild, 2014, p.568-70). 
This particular migration network formed on ease of travel with for example, Ulster 
migration most likely to occur to the West of Scotland although he concedes that 
some migrants did travel further afield. Indeed, Delaney (2007) notes that there were 
four major cities of Irish settlement in the 19th century- Glasgow, Manchester, 
Liverpool and London. MacRaild (2014, p.570) states that this flow of migrants is 
underrepresented in the literature however, the flow from Ulster to Scotland is still 
recognised as a ‘major arc of migration’. Walker (1995, p.9) notes that the Irish were 
the largest immigrant group to Scotland in the 19th and also early 20th century. As the 
majority of these immigrants were Catholic (approximately 75%) it is their 
experiences which have become well documented whilst those of the Protestant Irish 
remain largely unexplored. Moreover, according to Walker (1995) there is a dearth of 
literature which examines the emigration of Scots to Ulster during the same time 
period (see also Bradley, 2006).     
Delaney (2014, p.132) states that following the First World War, Britain became the 
first choice for Irish migrants and this was largely due to greater restrictions on 
immigration control in America. Indeed, short distance migrations became the norm 
after the 1920s and many Irish returned home from America following the depression 
in the 1930s (Delaney, 2007). He argues that Irish migration to Scotland had been 
declining since the 1870s and this continued during the 1940s as many Irish were 
attracted to the more prosperous South East of England following the decline of 
heavy industry in the North. That said, in the 1950s there were approx 90,000 Irish-
born in Scotland largely consisting of equal numbers of migrants from Ireland and 
Northern Ireland which, according to Delaney, (2007, p.17) reflects the traditional 
links between Ulster and Scotland. Indeed, the long-standing tradition of seasonal 
migration from the early 19th century onwards proved invaluable to the Scots in the 
lead up to the Second World War and was still in evidence in Scotland in the 1960s 
(ibid). 
According to Delaney (2007) many post-war Irish immigrants to Britain maintained a 
strong sense of Irish identity with few becoming completely assimilated into the 
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culture of their host societies. This was due in part to ‘constant interaction with the 
society they had left’ (ibid, p.3). He notes that ‘one of the characteristic features of 
the mass migrations of the post-war era was the interaction between migrants in 
Britain and friends and relatives at home’ and that the ‘proximity and constant 
movement back and forth across the Irish Sea for holidays and other visits ensured 
that siblings maintained contact with each other’ (Delaney, 2007, p.39). Family ties 
therefore remained strong ‘despite the obvious problems posed by distance and 
location’ (ibid, p.40). 
Migration, particularly for the Irish youth became integral to their life-cycle with 
emigration almost expected with their coming of age. Delaney, (2007, p.10) states 
that ‘Post war Britain offered hope to this disenfranchised generation who had little to 
gain from staying in Ireland but were still close enough to maintain relationships 
across the Irish Sea.’ Unlike others who had settled further afield in countries such 
as the USA and Australia the decision to migrate to Britain ‘did not involve a 
complete rupture with the homeland and family gatherings, weddings, funerals and 
holidays all made for continuing interactions with Ireland’ (ibid). He describes this 
1950s generation of young migrants as being ‘truly transnational’ in that their social 
space ‘crossed the borders of the nation-state and included family members and 
friends living in Britain and further afield.’ Moreover, relatives who had already 
migrated to Britain acted as ‘magnets’ for further migration. Those returning home for 
holidays also provided much information on their host country and provided an 
added stimulus for some to migrate (ibid, p.27). As a result these networks of Irish 
migration expanded ever further as ‘most young people would have known or at the 
very least have been aware of one relative or friend settled in Britain.’ (Delaney, 
2007, p.28) 
Unionism 
Farrington & Walker, (2009) state that there has been little comparative research 
conducted on the various identities within the UK. There is an extensive literature 
which considers Unionism in Northern Ireland (see for example Aughey, 1989; 
Bruce, 1986, 1994; Cochrane, 1994; Graham, 1998; Shirlow & McGovern, 1997; 
Southern, 2007). However, Farrington & Walker, (2009) argue that Unionism in 
particular has been largely misrepresented in terms of identity and its significance 
outside Northern Ireland has been overlooked. The authors state that in both 
Scotland and Northern Ireland ‘Unionism finds political significance through an 
ideological project committed to the Union, rather than simply ethnic or 
instrumentalist appeals to self-interest.’ Ambiguities exist in defining identities in the 
UK which can be described as ethnic, regional and national and which, within the 
UK, exist alongside a British identity (ibid, p.136/7) The authors note that both 
Scottish and Northern Irish unionists possess a strong British identity ‘but also have 
varying degrees of other identities’ which renders them difficult to classify (Farrington 
& Walker, 2009, p.137 and see also Farrington, 2001).  
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According to Farrington & Walker (2009, p.139) such unionism has existed in 
Northern Ireland since the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985 when ‘Ulster Unionists 
argued that the Union was a multi-national and multicultural framework in which a 
variety of identities could co-exist and prosper’. They note that Scottish unionists are 
not insecure in their identity unlike unionists in Northern Ireland who, when ‘faced 
with the prospect of an Irish nationalist political threat to their position in the Union’ 
sought Union as protection. For Scottish unionists, English indifference to the Union 
has been their major frustration. The authors point out that there is a major debate 
as to how to define the national identity of Ulster Unionists. They argue that the 
relationship between Northern Ireland’s unionists is asymmetrical in that ‘British 
identity is more important to Unionists than Unionists are to British identity’ 
(Farrington & Walker, 2009, p.140). Unionists in Northern Ireland therefore appear to 
be an anomalous group as they do not fit into existing models or theories. Indeed, 
whilst being defined by many as an ethnic group they possess ‘a strong regional 
identity that displays many of the characteristics of a nationalist movement but which 
is content within its state and simultaneously expects a strong form of autonomy’ 
(ibid, p.141). 
Farrington & Walker (2009, p.142) note that the UK has developed as a plurinational 
state to accommodate nationalist, regional politics within it. They argue that 
institutions are key ‘in the development of British national identity and in the 
development of the individual nationalities of each part of the UK’ and highlight the 
role of the welfare state, party system and devolution as being central to this. They 
note that ‘the Kirk, and separate legal and education systems have maintained 
Scottish distinctiveness’ and that Scotland is fully integrated into the British party 
system whereas Northern Ireland is not. Essentially, they have been excluded due to 
British parties not competing in Northern Ireland’s elections and also by the Northern 
Irish electorate being unwilling to vote for British parties. They argue that some 
unionists prefer it this way as ‘separate party political institutions better served their 
ethnic interests’ (ibid, p.144). Moreover, despite political representation at 
Westminster, politicians in Northern Ireland rarely engage with issues of British 
policy choosing instead to focus on matters relating only to Northern Ireland. 
Farrington & Walker (2009) conclude that the Union state may yet be flexible enough 
to contain secessionist tendencies and believe that Scotland (despite the election of 
an SNP minority government at the time) still favours the Union rather than 
independence. They also note that Unionists in Northern Ireland have been absent 
and also excluded from the debate which prompts the authors to argue that ‘greater 
engagement may be necessary in order to make their case better appreciated and 
understood outside Northern Ireland’. Indeed, IGR between peripheries is seen as 
being crucial in developing unionists identity and the authors believe that there are 
signs that future IGR may become more cooperative between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland in order to facilitate such a change (ibid, p.148).  
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Aughey (1989, 2001) also consistently argues that the disintegration of the UK is not 
an inevitable consequence of rising sub-state nationalism within it. More recently, 
Aughey (2014) utilises the Scottish independence referendum as a possible signifier 
for change in Northern Ireland over the next two decades alongside other potentially 
seismic political events such as an exit from the EU. He highlights the current 
discourse amongst nationalists in Scotland, Wales and Ireland that a terminal decline 
in Britishness has been replaced by popular nationalism which will ultimately lead to 
the break-up of Britain (Aughey, 2014, p.818). He notes that Scottish independence 
is integral to this nationalist narrative and any rise in English nationalism which may 
result from the referendum would be seen as being a potential accelerant for 
disintegration. However, Aughey (2014) also argues that unionists are inherently 
sceptical of this nationalist narrative and believe that future constitutional change will 
be modest and limited due to a number of constraining factors. Indeed, the 
continuing ability of the UK state to accommodate the national identities of its 
constituent parts and more importantly, the will of its people to endorse devolution 
rather than independence lead unionists to believe that the ‘prospect of the break-up 
of Britain is exaggerated’ (Aughey, 2014, p.817). 
Similarly, Aughey (2014) argues that unionists display equal scepticism to the 
prospect of Irish unity following constitutional change. He highlights the fact that 
since 2007 support for Irish unity has been declining in spite of electoral gains by 
Sinn Féin and that whilst the demographic gap between Protestants and Catholics 
may indeed be narrowing, only 25% of respondents identified as ‘Irish-only’ in the 
2011 census as opposed to 40% who felt solely British. Aughey (2014) also 
questions the willingness of the people within the Republic of Ireland to embrace the 
idea of reunification particularly in the current economic climate. Utilising a Sunday 
Independent/ Millward Brown poll conducted in 2013 he finds that 60% of 
respondents were in favour of uniting Ireland in the long-term but only just over half 
of these would like to see Irish unity in the near future. Perhaps more telling is the 
number of Irish citizens who would be prepared to pay higher taxes for a united 
Ireland. Only 11% were in favour of this as opposed to a resounding 67% who said 
no. This leads Aughey (2014, p.821) to agree that unionists’ scepticism over this 
issue is justified. 
Wood, (2014, p.41) argues that ‘if Scotland gains independence then it potentially 
marks a profound change for everyone living in Britain in terms of who ‘we’ are and 
our emotional attachments to particular peoples and places’. In terms of Scottish 
identity, she points to evidence that the Scots sense of Britishness would not 
diminish following independence. However, she finds this problematic given that the 
Scots would not be legally British. Wood (2014) points to Keating’s (2014) 
explanation of what an independent Scotland would consist of in that it proposed the 
rejection of one Union, ‘keeping the other five of currency, monarchy, society, 
Europe and defence. This is independence in a post-sovereignty era’ (Keating, 
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2014). Post-independence Britain is not being discussed. She argues that Scottish 
independence may be a positive event allowing other parts of Britain to re-evaluate 
what it means to be British in the 21st century yet talks here about the current crisis 
of multiculturalism and therefore appears to be relating this point primarily to England 
and also Wales. However, this raises questions of identity in Northern Ireland where 
a majority of the population are attached to the Union in such a variety of ways 
(politically, culturally, economically and historically) and where the maintenance of 
the Union is their raison d’etre. For unionists in Northern Ireland, Scottish 
independence would have had profound implications in terms of their identity and it 
will be interesting to assess the perceptions of unionist politicians to such matters. 
 
Nationalism  
According to Wood, (2014) there has been little consideration afforded to the issue of 
culture and identity in referendum debates due in part to the fact that the Yes 
campaign have deliberately engineered it thus. She suggests several cultural 
considerations which may illuminate the position of Northern Ireland’s nationalists in 
relation to the referendum. The first of these concerns inclusiveness in the vision of 
an independent Scotland. Wood, (2014, p.40) states that ‘the brand of Scottishness 
that is being promoted by the Scottish government is, and always has been, forward-
thinking, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, based on a Scottish nationalism that is 
strictly civic rather than ethnic in nature.’ This, she argues is reflected in the fact that 
only Scottish inhabitants (regardless of their ethnic or cultural backgrounds) were 
able to vote in the referendum. Wood (2014) suggests that traditional Scottish culture 
(Gaelic speakers for example) may have felt marginalised by the referendum due to 
the lack of consideration for them on the ballot paper. This prompts Wood (2014) to 
question whether Yes Scotland’s multi-cultural vision is at the expense of 
traditionalism and also to ask if other groups or cultures may have felt excluded from 
the referendum. Mycock (2012, p.54) however questions the ‘wholly civic’ nature of 
Scottish identity advanced by the SNP. He calls it a form of ‘black sheep nationalism’ 
which ‘seeks to denigrate rival constructions of Scottish national identity whilst 
overlooking limitations in their own understanding of the Scottish nation and 
nationalism’. Mycock (2012, p.56) notes that most of the SNP’s attack is aimed at 
Unionists who exhibit ‘a strong sense of Scottishness’ such as Gordon Brown as 
outlined above and argues that the shift of the party from ethnic-based nationalism in 
the 80s and 90s has not been absolute’.   
The second point to consider surrounds the growing sense of cultural confidence 
amongst Scottish nationalists which, according to them will only be truly fulfilled in an 
independent Scotland (Wood, 2014, p.40). Here, she highlights the emergent feeling 
from within the Scottish arts community that independence will ‘be the start of a huge 
renaissance in every aspect of Scottish culture’ (Scottish novelist Alan Bissett (2013) 
 23 
 
cited in Wood, 2014, p.41) and the ‘sense that independence is necessary in order 
for the people of Scotland to be fully confident in their identity and culture’ (ibid). 
Breaking free of London is seen as being a central factor in gaining this confidence 
and of being in control of their own destiny. Similarly, if independence is rejected, 
Wood (2014) argues that a corresponding slump in confidence (which is also under-
researched) must also be considered. This debate is still very much embryonic in 
nature and affords little consideration to Northern Ireland. However, the question 
Wood (2014) raises over the inclusivity of the referendum process is interesting 
particularly when considering that the Scottish vision is based on civic rather than 
ethnic nationalism. Indeed, it will be interesting to explore how Irish nationalists in the 
province relate to this vision of an independent Scotland and how they feel they may 
fit into it in the future. 
Cochrane (1994) emphasises Northern Ireland’s position as ‘a place apart’ in relation 
to both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. He argues that ‘the orthodox 
unionist and nationalist views of the external political environment are seriously 
flawed to the point that both camps have become oblivious to the shifting political 
universe which surrounds them’ (ibid, p.378). Furthermore, ‘there has been a 
symmetrical withdrawal of commitment to Northern Ireland on the part of Great 
Britain and the Republic of Ireland’ which neither unionists nor nationalists have 
appreciated fully (Cochrane, 1994, p.379). He argues that mainland support for 
unionists has been waning since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 
and much of this alienation lies in a lack of understanding of the unionist community 
in Northern Ireland. As unionists ‘have built an ideology around an allegiance to 
Britain, it is impossible for them to concede that the British-namely the English, 
Scottish and Welsh- do not want them and perceive no cultural commonality to exist’ 
(p.382). Unionist connections to Britishness are thus very outdated and lack genuine 
cultural connections.    
Nationalists also face problems in their relationship with the Republic of Ireland 
which historically has viewed Northern Ireland as being peripheral to its own policy 
making priorities (Cochrane, 1994, p.389). A combination of factors such as a 
relatively young population and the longevity of partition have contributed towards a 
lack of empathy for claims of British oppression by Northern nationalists. Moreover, 
an increasingly liberal and Europeanised outlook in the Republic coupled with an 
embarrassment of the ‘troubles’ have led a majority to be uninterested in Irish unity 
at least in the short-term. Both unionists and nationalists therefore appear to face 
similar dilemmas in terms of identity which further isolates them from wider UK and 
Irish identity politics (Cochrane, 1994).          
The considerable historical links which exist between the two countries stretch back 
to the 17th century and beyond. For instance, the well-documented Plantation of 
Ulster in 1609 is deemed by Cochrane (2013) to be the pivotal point in Irish history 
from which the current religious polarisation in Northern Ireland has arisen. 
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Described by Cochrane (2013, p.8) as an enormously ambitious project, the 
Plantation of Ulster saw an influx of some 170,000 English and Scottish Protestant 
settlers to Ulster in the space of a few years and stemmed from an attempt by the 
English to exert greater influence and control over a troublesome island. This policy 
of granting land to new Protestant settlers in exchange for loyalty to the Crown, 
created resentment and alienation amongst the Gaelic Catholic population and 
ultimately led to unrest and an uprising in the middle of the 17th century (Cochrane, 
2013).  
Walker (1995) describes how the Catholic uprising of 1641 prompted further 
significant arrivals of predominantly Scottish settlers in the latter part of the 17th 
century to help bolster the increasingly precarious Protestant position. Settling 
largely in the northern and eastern part of Ulster, Walker (1995, p.3) refers to this 
settlement as appearing ‘in part as a Scottish ‘colony’’. Andrew Holmes (2009) 
appears to concur with this view and highlights in greater depth the religious aspect 
of the Scottish settlement in Ulster during the Plantation. He documents the arrival of 
Presbyterianism along with the Scottish immigrants and describes how the religion 
was sustained and consolidated both by support from Scotland and by further 
periods of Scottish immigration. Holmes (2009, p.615/17) notes that ‘Presbyterians 
created a separate religious and political identity in the North East and used their 
sense of ‘Scottishness’ to formulate an Ulster-Scots identity’. Holmes (2009, p.617) 
like Walker (1995) argues that since its inception the identity has been used 
throughout history to bolster the unionist cause utilising a narrative which describes 
the Ulster-Scot as hard working, courageous and sober and highlights their exploits 
in relation to the Plantation, siege of Derry and the American Revolution (ibid, p.620). 
Further, according to Holmes (2009, p.619) ‘Scottishness complemented and 
reinforced the British identity of Presbyterians in Ireland’.  
Brian Graham (1998) argues that the Protestant community in Northern Ireland and 
particularly Ulster Unionists suffer from a confused identity by being essentially 
straddled between Irish nationalism on the one hand and allegiance to the British 
crown on the other. This link to Britain, whilst defining the Unionist allegiance, falls 
short of providing a Unionist identity as many Unionists believe that an Ulster identity 
must also reflect their position within the island of Ireland. Essentially, for Graham 
(1998) unionists seem pre-occupied with defining themselves against the ‘other’. 
Graham (1998, p.139) goes further to argue that the resurrection of the Ulster-Scots 
culture and identity is an attempt by Unionists to evince a form of ethnic nationalism 
by laying legitimate claim to Ulster territory whilst acknowledging a shared past with 
Ireland. This cultural narrative, in asserting Ulster as a distinct territory also has 
negative connotations in terms of its links with Britain (and especially England) and 
moreover, espousing a separateness from England (as Scotland has recently) 
arguably plays into the hands of nationalists seeking independence from the UK.  
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Ian Adamson’s (1982, 1991) theory on the origins of the early Irish inhabitants 
arguably forms the basis of the modern Ulster-Scots debate. Cochrane (2013), 
alludes to the fact that the sudden influx of Scottish settlers during the 17th century 
added to the numbers of generations already present within Ireland at the time and 
this is confirmed by Walker (1995) who offers reminders that population migration 
between the two countries had existed long before either formed a relatively modern 
identity and that in the pre-Roman era, Western Scotland formed part of the Ulster 
kingdom of Dalriada (Walker, 1995, p.4 and see also Graham, 1998). Building on 
A.T.Q Stewart’s (1977) theory that some of the Planters of the 17th century were 
likely to be descendants of early Ulster invaders of Scotland, Adamson (1982, 1991) 
goes further to argue that the earliest settlers of Ireland were not the Celts or Gaels 
but the Cruthin, a people closely related to the Scottish Picts. If this theory is 
accurate then the Cruthin, (who Adamson believes sought refuge in Scotland from 
the Irish Gaels) upon returning to Ulster during the Plantation era, would be 
descendants of the original inhabitants of the island. As Walker (1995) points out, 
such information is of great significance to those in Ulster (particularly within the 
Protestant community) who seek to establish an identity in contrast with that of Irish 
nationalism yet which still retains a link to Britain (see also Graham, 1998).  
The accuracy of Adamson’s theory has been called into question amongst many 
academic quarters. Cathal McCall (2002) is a particularly vociferous critic. He 
highlights the fact that Ian Adamson is a member of the UUP and describes 
Adamson’s theory as an ‘invention’ and a ‘construction’ with dubious anthropological 
credence based wholly on a myth which is yet to become established. By 
highlighting the contentious role of cultural myths in modern nation-building, McCall 
(2002) questions the historical accuracy of Adamson’s theory and the dubious 
lineage of the Cruthin (see also Nic Craith, 2001). Indeed, he highlights the ‘myth of 
siege’ linked to the Ulster Unionist identity as being a much more solid and credible 
foundation with which to differentiate themselves from Irish nationalists (McCall, 
2002, p.201). Essentially, McCall (2002) argues that the Ulster-Scots tradition, 
culture and language has been revived and reinvented in the 1990s in response to 
the political transformation in Northern Ireland. In essence, for McCall (2002) Ulster-
Scots is an Ulster Unionist counter-response to the ascendency of Irish nationalism. 
Stapleton and Wilson (2004) point out that the Ulster-Scots identity has emerged not 
only from socio-political transformation, but also from unease and insecurity of 
increased devolution in the UK and changes in perceptions of ‘Britishness’. However, 
they are also keen to establish that the Ulster-Scots identity has not been contrived 
and it is a ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ identity and culture in contemporary Northern Ireland 
(Stapleton & Wilson, 2004, p.564). One of the more interesting points they make 
alludes to the fact that the Ulster-Scots identity and use of language (Ullans) is by no 
means exclusive to the Protestant community. Indeed, according to the authors, 
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some of the first Scots to settle in Ulster were from the Highlands and were therefore 
mainly Catholic.  
Language 
There appears to be a general consensus amongst scholars that the Ulster-Scots 
language (or Ullans as it was re-named), emerged in the 1990s in response to the 
political transformation of Northern Ireland (Dowling, 2007; McCall, 2002; Nic Craith, 
2001; Stapleton & Wilson, 2004). There is however, some disagreement over the 
prevalence of the language prior to this time. Dowling (2007) for instance argues that 
before the 1990s there was little widespread recognition of it (see also Nic Craith, 
2001) whilst McCall (2002) and Walker (1995) are clear that Ulster-Scots is an 
established language which has undergone a revival. That said, most agree that its 
re-emergence was effectively a counter-response by unionists to the continued 
promotion of the Irish language, providing a timely boost for unionist identity during a 
period of cultural and political uncertainty (Crowley, 2006; McCall, 2002). The 
question of the status of Ulster-Scots as a language or a dialect lies at the heart of 
the debate although as Radford (2001) points out, it could be argued that this now 
matters little given that the GFA accorded Ulster-Scots equal status with the Irish 
language. Indeed, as Nic Craith (2001, p.23) highlights, the GFA states that all 
participants: 
‘recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation 
to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-
Scots and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are 
part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland’.  
Moreover, the ratification of the European charter for Lesser-Used Languages in 
1999 by the British government cemented both Irish and Ulster-Scots as languages 
(ibid). 
There are many critics of the Ulster-Scots language, most notably amongst the 
nationalist community who see its equal status as a threat to future funding of the 
Irish language (Nic Craith, 2001). It has been disparaged as an example of ‘bad 
English’ and is seen by many as being ‘backward, premodern and rural’ and 
therefore completely at odds with a modern and industrialised region (McCall, 2002, 
p.203). Similarly, others argue that it is merely a dialect of Ulster English which has 
been promoted for political purposes. Indeed, Nic Craith (2001, p.22) highlights the 
fact that before the 1990s current promoters of Ulster-Scots (most notably Ian 
Adamson) described it as a version of the English language (see also Crowley, 
2006). However, she disputes this, arguing that Ulster-Scots is a dialect of Scots 
rather than English although she stops short of identifying it as a language. The 
identification of Ulster-Scots as a dialect rather than a distinct language is seen as 
being problematic by McCall (2002, p.205) as he notes that ‘dialects...are still 
perceived generally to be an impediment to the social and economic progress of the 
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individual’. This, in his opinion, may inhibit its success in providing a foundation for 
Ulster-Scots culture and has led some to question whether Ulster-Scots language is 
necessary for a revival.  
Dowling (2007) also finds that basing an identity on a language is problematic as 
languages tend to be geographically as well as culturally inclusive and as such he 
argues that Ulster-Scots is also likely to be spoken by some Catholics and 
nationalists (see also Stapleton & Wilson, 2004). He therefore questions the 
effectiveness of a unionist counter-identity founded on language. The earlier study 
by McCall (2002) reached roughly the same conclusion. By interviewing unionist 
politicians and activists shortly after the implementation of the GFA, McCall (2002) 
found that despite feeling that their culture was under threat, most unionists across 
the political spectrum were sceptical about the legitimacy of Ulster-Scots and 
therefore its ability to provide a successful foundation for a cultural reinvention. As 
there have been no similar studies conducted in the intervening years, the findings 
from this study will reveal how the language is currently viewed by elites across the 
political spectrum and therefore assess the current political significance of Ulster-
Scots.  
Religion, sectarianism and sport 
The existence of sectarianism in Northern Ireland is widely acknowledged to be one 
of the main reasons why the social, economic and political progression of the 
province is being hampered. Many scholars agree that division in Northern Ireland is 
historical, structural and entrenched and is therefore difficult to break down. Brewer 
for instance (1992, p.358/9) defines sectarianism as ‘the determination of actions, 
attitudes and practices by beliefs about religious difference, which results in their 
being invoked as the boundary marker to represent social stratification and conflict.’  
Todd (2009) identifies three stages of division and related conflict in the history of 
Ireland/Northern Ireland. The first occurred during the 17th century plantation where 
two communities (Protestants and Catholics) became opposed and where religion 
became the dominant signifier in terms of difference’ (McVeigh & Rolston, 2007, 
p.4). The second arose from partition whereby religious segregation became 
entrenched and intensified and ‘defined the two communities in opposing national 
and state-centric terms’ (Todd, 2009, p.343). As McVeigh & Rolston (2007, p.6) note: 
‘partition of the island in 1921 was the first sectarian act from which the other 
sectarian institutions, relations and practices flowed.’ This places much emphasis on 
the formation of the state in defining sectarianism. The third phase began with the 
onset of the troubles. This division became political (constitutional) but was ‘fuelled 
by religious ethos, economic conditions and perceived injustice’ (Todd, 2009, p.344). 
She argues that each subsequent phase compounded the division and conflict which 
had gone before and concludes that ‘partition created the conditions for lasting 
conflict in Northern Ireland...In effect it created a structural bind, in which nationalist 
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equality came to threaten unionist security’ (ibid, p.341.) McVeigh & Rolston (2007, 
p.10) state that sectarianism persists in Northern Ireland following The Agreement 
(see also Geoghegan, 2008; Shirlow, 2001) and is even considered as being 
‘normality’. They state that: 
‘There is no area of social life in Northern Ireland which is not sectarianised, 
or structured in some way by sectarianism. It continues to profoundly structure 
where people are born, where they go to school, where they live, where they 
work, where they socialise, what sports teams they support and where they 
are buried.’   (McVeigh & Rolston, 2007, p.16). 
The existence of sectarianism in Scotland is rather less well known and has 
spawned a contentious debate amongst scholars. Much evidence is put forward for 
its’ existence by the Scottish historian Tim Devine (2000) see also Walls & Williams, 
2005) which is counterbalanced by the views of Bruce, (2000), Bruce, Glendinning, 
Paterson & Rosie, (2004) and Rosie (2004) who find little evidence for the 
phenomena and dismiss it as nothing more than a social myth. As there appears to 
be very little grey-area in this debate it is worth noting Walker’s (2012) take on the 
issue. Essentially, those who argue for its existence see sectarianism as being deep-
rooted and based on Anti-Catholicism whilst those against (Bruce most notably) 
believe its existence is largely insignificant and manifests only in social situations 
such as football matches (Walker, 2012, p.375).    
Bruce et al (2004, p.124) identify three signifiers of sectarianism in Scotland; the 
Ulster conflict, football rivalry and street violence. Indeed, Bruce (2000, p.141) feels 
that the current extent of sectarianism in Scotland amounts to ‘slumming at the 
weekend’ which may involve attending Old Firm games ‘and shouting sectarian 
abuse at the Celtic players’. He argues that the Old Firm rivalry between Glasgow 
Rangers and Glasgow Celtic amounts to just that and is left at the stadium gates. 
Moreover, Bruce et al (2004, p.132) state that: ‘Football rivalry is a social force in its 
own right that should not, without considerable scaling down, be taken to stand for 
anything else’. 
Many scholars disagree with Bruce’s (2000, 2004) views. MacMillan (2000, p.18/19) 
for instance who reignited the debate on Scottish sectarianism in 1999, argues that 
religion and football (particularly in terms of the Old Firm) are inextricably linked and 
inevitably result in sectarianism. Being of Catholic faith, he cites several instances 
whereby events in Northern Ireland (such as the murder of loyalist prisoner Billy 
Wright) appeared to generate sympathy amongst certain Rangers players and 
officials. Styles, (2000 p.118) is equally convinced of the presence of sectarianism 
within Scottish football. He describes ‘the rivalry between Celtic and Rangers as 
being in large part, an expression of the tensions between Catholic and Protestant’. 
Moreover, according to Styles (2000) such public rivalries enable sectarianism to 
persist in Scotland.  
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The study by Bairner & Shirlow (1998, p.168) raises an interesting point which links 
sport (particularly football) with the issue of ethno-identity in Northern Ireland. They 
note that ‘the general relationship between politics and sport in Northern Ireland is 
already well established’ and that ‘the organisation of sport in the province not only 
reflects but can also exacerbate sectarian attitudes and the politics of division...’ By 
examining the identity of fans in relation to Linfield Football Club and its stadium 
Windsor Park they reveal that both the team and the stadium are linked to 
Protestantism. Thus, the existence of the Northern Ireland national soccer team is of 
great importance to unionists (particularly men) and ‘a unionist atmosphere 
surrounds the game at its highest levels’ (ibid, p.169). Catholics are therefore largely 
unwelcome in such sporting arenas and make conscious decisions to stay away. 
They describe this ‘hegemonic control over soccer’ as an extension of the ‘siege 
mentality’ which simultaneously expresses ‘cultural resistance to the nationalist 
‘other’ whilst celebrating their own unionist/loyalist identity (Bairner & Shirlow, 1998, 
p.169/174). Stadia such as Windsor Park therefore become ‘political metaphors for 
the political territory which is regarded as being in need of defence’ (ibid). The 
assertion of the authors that this approach may also apply to other areas 
experiencing ‘ethno-sectarian conflict’ outside Northern Ireland suggests that a 
similar unionist approach to supporting Glasgow Rangers may exist and this needs 
to be tested against the data.  
Conclusion 
A review of relevant literature demonstrates that there are a number of potentially 
meaningful formal and informal connections between Northern Ireland and Scotland. 
These cover high politics, with East-West policy and institutional connections, as well 
as party interaction. However, they also relate to historical and cultural ties that could 
be significant personally as well as politically influential. 
This literature review examined specific areas of scholarly research to discover the 
potential political and cultural connections which may exist between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland following the recent Scottish independence referendum. It has 
consistently shown that the post-devolution literature has a predominantly British 
focus which significantly marginalises Northern Ireland from contemporary debates. 
As such, the review revealed that there is a distinct dearth of significant literature 
which examines Northern Ireland’s position in relation to the Scottish independence 
referendum or which considers the current political or cultural relationship which 
exists between Scotland and Northern Ireland. Indeed, there is almost a complete 
absence of empirical evidence which examines the perceptions of Northern Irish 
elites to such issues. Therefore, section one of the analysis aims to discover how 
Northern Ireland’s unionist, nationalist and non-aligned elites interact with political 
developments in Scotland.  
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There appears to be some contention amongst scholars in the ability of the 
institutions of the UK devolution system to foster and develop cooperation, 
agreement and innovation amongst devolved nations and particularly between 
Scotland and Northern Ireland (see Swenden & McEwen, 2014 for example). In 
contrast, Birrell, (2012) arguably the foremost expert in post-devolution Northern 
Ireland politics consistently argues that institutional fora such as the BIC are 
significant to Northern Ireland politics in terms of IGR and the use of such institutions 
also facilitates policy transfer between the two countries. However, despite these 
claims, Birrell (2012) finds little evidence of such transfer between them. To date, 
there is a lack of detailed literature which specifically examines the post-devolution 
political relationship between Scotland and Northern Ireland and certainly there are 
none which consider the views of the region’s politicians in relation to such debates. 
Section two will therefore fill this gap in scholarship by assessing the views of 
Northern Ireland’s politicians on the significance of formal party, institutional and 
policy linkage between Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
A significant overlap exists in the literature with regard to the historical, cultural and 
religious links which connect Scotland and Northern Ireland and these specific areas 
will form the basis of investigations in section three. Much of the focus of this 
literature relates to unionism with the Ulster-Scots identity appearing to be central to 
this. However, it has also been suggested that nationalist identity is also not without 
problem (Graham, 1998) and requires further investigation. Indeed, Wood (2014) 
claims that there has been little consideration afforded to the issue of culture and 
identity in recent referendum debates and of the little that has been said most relates 
to Scotland and not Northern Ireland.  
Whilst much of the established research provides insight into the ways in which 
Northern Ireland and Scotland could be connected to each other, a rigorous review 
of the impact of these links in the contemporary era is an obvious gap in the 
literature. Within the constraints of a project of this size a particular aspect of that 
gap emerges as a feasible and useful area of analysis, namely the issue of 
significance. As the introduction showed, both popular and academic debate around 
the independence referendum focused very narrowly on Scotland and England and 
so exploring the reaction of Northern Ireland’s politicians is a useful starting point for 
investigation. However, beyond that there is the issue of how much the possible 
points of similarity and connection that have been identified in this review have 
significance and meaning for those in a position to make something of these links. A 
critical evaluation of relative significance and meaning in relation to these formal and 
informal ties would therefore contribute something contemporary and original to this 
topic. In light of this the following research questions have been formulated:  
1. What do reactions to the referendum highlight about how unionist, nationalist 
and non-aligned political perspectives interact with political developments in 
Scotland? 
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2. How significant are formal party, institutional and policy links between 
Scotland and Northern Ireland for Northern Ireland’s politicians? 
3. How significant are cultural links and connections between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland for Northern Ireland’s politicians? 
The following chapter will discuss the methods employed to provide answers to 
these questions. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology  
As an original contribution to post-devolution knowledge, the study employs a 
qualitative strategy of enquiry utilising primary research data collected from in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews conducted with senior political elites representing all 
major parties within Northern Ireland (see page v for list). This form of purposive 
sampling ensured that all subjects included in the study would have a firm and 
current grasp of the subject matter (see Robinson, 2014, p.32). Moreover, by 
ensuring cross-party representation of unionists, nationalists and the non-aligned in 
the sample, the study incorporates a broad range of the perceptions of Northern Irish 
politicians towards Scotland. The willingness of multiple party leaders and other 
senior elites to participate in the study reflects the salience and relevance of the 
research subject and the fact that to date, it is an area of the devolution and 
constitutional debate which has been considerably under-researched. As a result 
there were no problems encountered in gaining access to participants or securing 
the availability of elites for interview. 
There is a growing body of literature which seeks to examine the issue of researcher 
identity and how this relates to conducting successful research in sensitive locations 
such as Northern Ireland (Reed, 2012). McEvoy (2006) for example argues that 
interviewing political elites in Northern Ireland can be problematic in that participants 
may make assumptions regarding the identity of a researcher and therefore tailor 
their responses accordingly. Also, politicians ‘may be reluctant to stray from the party 
line due to the zero-sum nature of Northern Ireland politics’ and researchers may 
need to probe in order to extrapolate further detail (McEvoy, 2006, p.184). Whilst 
these problems appear to be more salient for researchers originating from Northern 
Ireland, they also apply to ‘outsiders’. Hermann (2001) for instance highlights the fact 
that all researchers (particularly those with an Irish or British cultural heritage) should 
be mindful of bringing pre-conceived bias into the interview.  
Reed (2012) found that as an English researcher, a considerable amount of 
background research on Northern Ireland was needed to become acquainted with its 
complexities and he argues that such knowledge is a prerequisite for building 
relationships with participants. Therefore, in order to minimise bias in this study an 
initial extensive review of the academic literature was undertaken in order to 
establish the relevant theoretical perspectives and to become familiar with both the 
historical and current situation in Northern Ireland. Preparation of the interview 
schedule was then thorough and rigorous and careful to avoid antagonistic phrasing 
or controversial lines of questioning. Being an English researcher and therefore 
classed as an ‘outsider’, all interviews were conducted from as neutral a perspective 
as possible, a technique which Reed (2012) believes may elicit more broad and 
personal responses and which may in turn produce a more objective analysis. 
Indeed, it was found that as Scotland was the predominant focus of the research 
many participants provided more generous personal responses to questions when 
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they were not directly related to party politics in Northern Ireland. However, despite 
the best efforts of employing a neutral approach and by adhering to a strictly neutral 
line of questioning, interviewees inevitably strayed towards an adversarial 
commentary which followed party lines. However, such expressions were largely 
made tangentially and to a certain extent were mostly irrelevant to the research 
subject and therefore did not significantly affect the final analysis. 
The originality of the research and therefore the largely exploratory methodological 
strategy utilised translates into a predominantly constructivist epistemological 
approach. The use of semi-structured interviews as the method of data collection 
reflects the fact that according to Guba & Lincoln, (1994, p.111) within the 
constructivist paradigm ‘individual constructions can be elicited and refined only 
through interaction between and among investigator and respondents’. Moreover, 
the exploratory nature of the study, the relative inexperience of the researcher and 
the complexity of both the participants involved and the research subject are 
accommodated within this constructivist approach as it is essentially pragmatic in 
nature and aims to promote a greater understanding of the research subject by 
participants and researcher alike (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Thematic analysis was 
utilised to aid flexibility in the interpretation of data whilst simultaneously 
accommodating the relative inexperience of the researcher to the process (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). As outlined above, a thorough review of the relevant literature was 
conducted prior to data collection and the research questions were subsequently 
formulated from this review. Therefore, the data analysis was theoretical and not 
inductive in nature (ibid) and coding was carried out by paying specific attention to 
the relevant research questions. 
It is acknowledged that there are limitations within the chosen methodology. A case 
study approach would have provided greater scope to examine the views of 
respondents from multiple perspectives by triangulating primary data with secondary 
documentary sources. However, such a technique is also not without its critics (see 
for instance Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gerring, 2004; Nissen, 1998). Moreover, the constraints 
of time and resources which regularly beset Master’s projects were particularly 
pertinent in the completion of this study thus limiting the chosen methodological 
approach. That said, as a study which seeks to discover the extent of Scotland’s 
influence on Northern Ireland politics, an analysis of primary interview data garnered 
from senior Northern Irish political elites is sufficient and appropriate to be able to 
answer the research questions and make an original contribution to post-devolution 
knowledge in the UK.  
All ethical considerations were addressed throughout all stages of the study 
particularly with regard to interview procedures and protocol. An initial submission to 
the School Research and Ethics Panel (SREP) established the ethical parameters of 
the research and these were adhered to throughout the completion of the study. All 
participants were supplied with an outline of the research brief and therefore gave 
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informed consent to take part in the study. Elites were also made aware that they 
could withdraw from the research at any time at no detriment to themselves. 
Additionally, as some interviews were conducted over the telephone, these 
participants were informed that the interview would be recorded and they gave their 
additional verbal consent to this. Finally, all data collected was handled following the 
necessary data protection protocol with hard copies of data being held in locked, 
secure storage and computerised material protected on password-encrypted 
computers.  
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Chapter Four: Analysis 
Section One 
The interaction of Northern Ireland’s politicians with the Scottish independence 
referendum 
Introduction 
The Scottish independence referendum had significant implications for Northern 
Ireland due to its potential to stimulate nationalism within all constituent parts of the 
UK. As outlined in the introduction to this thesis, Northern Ireland became 
marginalised in relation to the referendum and it has been argued by Bradbury 
(2015) and Keating (2014) that the main reason for this stemmed from the fact that 
political parties in Northern Ireland were excluded from both sides of the referendum 
campaign in Scotland. As a result of such exclusion Bradbury (2015) further argues 
that the impact of the referendum on the region was minimal. By examining the 
reactions of cross-party elites to the referendum, the following section aims to 
discover how politicians in Northern Ireland approached the campaign and how they 
responded to the result thus determining the extent of their political interaction with 
the referendum in general. The section argues that all of the major political parties 
represented in this study were largely uninvolved with the referendum campaign due 
either to self-exclusion or exclusion by both sides of the Scottish referendum 
campaigns. Moreover, the political impact of the referendum on Northern Ireland was 
indeed minimal with all major parties (with the exception of the SDLP) reporting little 
or no change in party outlook or strategy.  
To provide context for the subsequent discussion, the section begins by outlining the 
respective political stances of the main political parties towards the issue of Scottish 
independence. 
Political stances towards the referendum 
Before embarking on any specific analyses of the reactions of Northern Irish 
politicians to the referendum, it is first helpful to document their respective political 
stances towards it. Here, as one might expect given their raisons d’être, the primary 
data shows a clear divide between the views of unionist and nationalist politicians. 
Unsurprisingly, all unionists (Wells; Barr; Sugden; Allister and McNarry) were 
opposed to Scottish independence, wishing the Union to remain intact. Health 
Minister Jim Wells of the right-wing DUP summarised the unionist position: ‘You 
know we’re entirely a pro-UK, pro-Union party...the party to a man or a woman would 
have wanted Scotland to stay. We are much stronger as the four countries of the 
UK...’  
By contrast, both nationalist respondents were equally clear that they welcomed the 
prospect of Scottish independence. Veteran MLA John Dallat of centre-left SDLP 
 36 
 
commented: ‘...we were totally supportive of the referendum and we er, wished it 
every success and just sorry it wasn’t successful...’ Caitriona Ruane, Chief Whip for 
left-wing Sinn Féin concurred and stated: ‘...obviously the vast majority of our party 
and our support base would have loved to see Scottish independence.’ Neither 
respondent made any direct link between the prospect of Scottish independence and 
its possibilities for a united Ireland rather their focus was on seeing the Scots 
‘achieve their full potential’  (Ruane, 2015). Such comments appear to resonate with 
Wood’s (2014) suggestion in that for Northern Irish nationalists at least; 
independence is seen as being necessary to gain full cultural confidence. 
Respondents from the non-aligned parties were then split on the issue of Scottish 
independence. Professor John Barry, former leader of the left-wing GPNI made it 
clear that he was a supporter. For Barry the largely civic nationalist approach of the 
SNP and the fact that the Scottish Greens had worked alongside them in advancing 
‘a left-wing progressive alternative to austerity’ was a major factor in Barry’s support 
for Scottish independence. He added: ‘...for all those reasons not least then of 
course about getting rid of Faslane and Trident and so on which all Green parties on 
these islands will be supportive of erm, I was supportive of a ‘yes’ vote.’  
However, leader of the APNI David Ford, a centrist and devolutionist described the 
Scots’ decision to hold the referendum as ‘a fairly negative way to be proceeding’ 
and was clear that his party supports further ‘significant devolution to Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland’. For Ford and the Alliance Party, devolution is seen as 
being the platform around which ‘further progress’ can be made in terms of the long-
term future of the Union. 
Party political approaches to the referendum campaign 
Despite the high constitutional stakes of the referendum for unionist and non-aligned 
politicians and the clear opportunity it presented for nationalists, all political parties in 
Northern Ireland were largely uninvolved in the referendum campaign. Both Wells 
and Stephen Barr of the UUP were keen to be seen to be exerting minimal 
interference in the campaign and cited unwelcome meddling in their own affairs as 
justification for such an approach. Wells declared: ‘Well, what the Scottish do is 
entirely their affair. We wouldn’t want the Scots to interfere in any referendum in 
Northern Ireland and vice-versa.’ Such opinion was not only confined to unionists. 
Both Barry and Ruane reported that the GPNI and Sinn Féin respected ‘the right of 
the Scottish people to make their decisions...’ Moreover, the ‘very careful’ approach 
of Sinn Féin to the referendum appears to support Bell’s (2014) suggestion that the 
party were reluctant to actively engage with the ‘yes’ campaign due to their negative 
and ‘divisive associations’. This is further supported by leader of UKIPNI David 
McNarry who, in making reference to the wider issue of sectarianism and how 
interference from politicians in Northern Ireland could have been construed in 
Scotland, indicates that unionists also had to be ‘very careful’ in their approach and 
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were similarly aware that their particular brand of politics may have been unhelpful to 
their Scottish counterparts in the ‘no’ campaign. 
Therefore, politicians from across the political spectrum and not just Sinn Féin as 
indicated by Bell, (2014) appeared to be mindful that their particular type of ethno-
centric politics may not have been helpful to the causes of their Scottish 
counterparts. As such, the DUP, UUP, GPNI and Sinn Féin respected the right of the 
Scots to determine their own future and were reluctant to become overtly involved. 
Indeed, the minimal interference of the DUP and nationalist parties in the referendum 
campaign is confirmed by Wells who remarked:  
‘Obviously some people were invited over to campaign and sometimes the 
Orange Order came over for rallies and you know, we took part in some 
debates but we watched and waited...the nationalists also kept out of it. They 
could see the dangers of becoming directly involved.’  
Both Dallat and Ford revealed that the SDLP and the APNI had approached their 
Scottish campaign counterparts with offers of assistance and were rebuffed. This 
supports the views of Bradbury (2015) and Keating (2014) that both sides of the 
referendum campaign in Scotland were keen to exclude Northern Irish parties from 
becoming involved. The reluctance of the SNP to engage with Irish nationalists as 
suggested by Bradbury (2015) is supported by Dallat who disclosed that the SDLP 
were given short shrift by the SNP in talks held before the referendum. He declared:  
‘We had some discussions with the SNP before the referendum. They were 
keen that we wouldn’t overtly be seen to be er, identifying with it because they 
weren’t at that stage and we you know, listened carefully and took their 
advice.’  
Similarly, Ford’s comments reveal that it was not only unionists who were 
unwelcome in the Better Together campaign as also suggested by Bradbury (2015). 
The offer of help from the Alliance Party to the Scottish Liberal Democrats ‘even in 
the context of having slightly more sensible, liberal views from Northern Ireland’ was 
rebuffed as ‘they just really wanted to run things on a Scottish basis only’.  As a 
result, Ford stated ‘that we respected them and left them to it’ which is a similar 
reaction to that exhibited by mainstream unionists, the GPNI and Sinn Féin. It is 
telling that Ford alludes to a certain amount of involvement from Wales in the 
campaign, yet the APNI were excluded. This further supports the views of Bradbury 
(2015) and Keating (2014) that both sides of the Scottish referendum campaign 
wished to disassociate themselves from Northern Ireland’s sectarian politics. Indeed, 
Barry stated that in the context of the referendum, the link between Northern Ireland 
and Scotland would mean little to the Scottish electorate and he believes that ‘for 
most people it’s not on the agenda and if it is, Northern Ireland is associated with 
bad stuff- killings, bombings, sectarian killings and all the rest of it’. Independent 
Unionist Claire Sugden agreed that Northern Ireland was given little consideration 
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during the referendum campaign and that the province is often ‘forgotten about’ 
because of its history. As such she feels that Northern Ireland is largely irrelevant in 
terms of current Scottish nationalism, a view which resonates with that of Keating, 
(2014). 
The impact of the referendum on Northern Ireland politics  
It has been argued by Bradbury (2015) that the referendum result had little impact on 
Northern Ireland as parties had largely been excluded from the referendum 
campaign and debate. For those respondents who were opposed to independence 
and particularly unionists this appears to be very much the case. McNarry 
commented: ‘It has really, it’s been strange in Northern Ireland really. Politically, it 
(the referendum) has had no direct or specific bearing on unionists.’ Of all unionist 
participants this is particularly evident in Wells’ responses. Like the majority of 
unionists, he was clearly relieved that the Scots had ultimately rejected 
independence yet described the impact of the referendum on Northern Ireland as 
being ‘very limited’ and was clear that the DUP had other priorities once the result 
was delivered. Wells stated:    
‘So erm, relief and it moved on and after September 18th we didn’t give it too 
much thought. Had it gone the other way oh gosh, it would have been a huge 
issue for us... but once the decision was banked and pocketed we just moved 
on with so many crises that we’re dealing with’. 
Clearly this is a reference to the impasse over welfare reform and the failure of the 
Haass initiative which threatened to destabilise if not suspend the Northern Ireland 
government. However, Wells is clear that the DUP gave little further thought to the 
referendum after the result or the ensuing rise in Scottish nationalism which resulted 
from it. Other participants were more concerned with the post-referendum future of 
the Union. Stephen Barr, senior policy advisor to the UUP recognised the fact that 
‘there are changes afoot’ within the UK devolution settlement and that the UUP were 
prepared to ‘play their part’ in any necessary reforms. Barr observed that England is 
‘getting frustrated which isn’t good and the Scots seem to have an appetite for 
something more’. Indeed, the English question appeared to be at the forefront of 
most unionist (and Alliance) minds in the immediate aftermath of the referendum. 
Both McNarry and Ford reiterated calls for a Constitutional Convention. Ford felt this 
was needed in light of David Cameron’s lacklustre response to the referendum which 
he deemed to be ‘distinctly unhelpful’. As a proponent of federalism, Ford described 
the lack of representation of England within the current devolution arrangements as 
‘a real problem’ and that whilst the ‘retreat into English nationalism’ by the 
Conservative Party had helped them to ‘fend off UKIP, it hasn’t actually done 
anything to look to the long-term needs of the UK.’ 
Fringe unionists Allister and McNarry also commented on the possibility that England 
may tire of providing financial support to the Celtic periphery which supports the view 
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of Cartrite, (2012). McNarry remarked that the referendum had ‘made the English 
population wake up’ with regards to the Barnett Formula ‘and particularly about how 
well Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do compared to some of the regions in 
England, particularly in the North of England...’ Such developments would be 
particularly problematic for Northern Ireland which currently relies heavily on financial 
assistance provided by the Barnett Formula.  
The majority of respondents who were opposed to independence agree with Jeffery 
(2015) that any future threat to the Union will likely originate in either England or 
Scotland. In the short-term they seem to be largely preoccupied with the English 
question rather than the possibilities of a second Scottish independence referendum. 
However, contrary to the views of Bell, (2014) and Cartrite, (2012) several 
participants appear to suggest that Irish nationalism in the province has also been 
stimulated by the referendum. Only respondents from the right of the political 
spectrum commented on the significance of this. Leader of TUV Jim Allister for 
instance remarked that the relative closeness of the referendum result had ‘reignited 
for them (Irish nationalists) their aspiration and perhaps given them a bit of a fillip’. 
He went on to declare that the referendum had fed ‘the romanticism of Irish 
nationalism in that regard and to that extent has been destabilising here.’  
Furthermore, Barry observed that both Sinn Féin and to a lesser extent, the SDLP 
were ‘all in favour’ of Scottish independence and ‘were making common cause with 
the SNP’ due to the similarities in their respective political projects. Ruane for 
instance stated that there was ‘a huge dynamic’ surrounding the referendum and 
found the renewed debate ‘around whether you call it a United Kingdom or a 
disunited Kingdom as really interesting’. That said, she also stated that there was 
little prospect of a united Ireland in terms of demographics at the time of the 
referendum and that ‘what needs to happen is, there needs to be an unstoppable 
momentum towards change in this part of Ireland.’ Ruane elaborated that part of this 
change would involve significant electoral gains by Sinn Féin and declared that ‘Sinn 
Féin is growing North and South and would ‘do very well in the elections next year.’ 
However, according to Aughey (2014) support for Irish unity is declining despite 
electoral gains by Sinn Féin. Ultimately, the approach of Sinn Féin to the referendum 
could be described as being largely opportunistic as suggested by Bradbury (2015) 
and Irish unity remains the long-term goal of the party. Indeed, following the 
referendum result Wells observed that ‘Sinn Féin have pulled their horns in because 
I think they saw this as a good opportunity which just hasn’t come.’ Deputy First 
Minister Martin McGuinness did issue a call for a border poll following the 
referendum result (Belfast Telegraph, 2014), but given the many political crises 
occurring within the region at the time and the pressing issue of corporation tax, such 
a call appeared to be given little credence by unionists politicians.     
In terms of post-referendum party strategy, the majority of respondents reported little 
or no change. Again, Wells was particularly forthright on this issue declaring that the 
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DUP had not ‘changed our stance one iota’. He felt that as ‘a 100% Unionist, pro-
Union, pro-British party’ the position of the DUP need not be compromised. He does 
concede that if the Scots had voted to secede from the Union, the DUP ‘might have 
changed fundamentally how we’d be dealing with things’ but gives no detail as to 
what that would have entailed. Ultimately, Wells felt that the position of the DUP was 
‘stronger and enhanced as a result of the Scottish people’s decision’ and appeared 
to be satisfied that in the short-term at least, the future of the Union seems assured. 
Such opinion is echoed by several participants who were opposed to independence. 
Barr for instance confirms the pro-Union position of the UUP which he feels has 
been reaffirmed by the rejection of independence. He stated: ‘No erm, if anything it 
er... we’ve always been firm believers in the Union. We see the Union in economic, 
political, social, cultural terms that it makes sense for us on all those levels.’ 
Similarly, for Ford, a devolutionist and supporter of the ‘no’ campaign, the result 
arguably presented the best case scenario for the Alliance Party and as such 
reported no change in party strategy.  
Despite the clear opportunity that the referendum presented for Sinn Féin, Ruane 
reported a similar inflexibility in party strategy to that advanced by Wells of the DUP. 
She confirmed that uniting Ireland is a long-term strategy for the party yet when 
asked what Sinn Féin’s response would have been had Scotland voted ‘yes’ she 
replied: 
‘Well we’d probably have done the exact same as we’re doing now. I mean 
we’ve our political project; the Scots have their political project erm, we’re 
clear we want a united Ireland and that’s where we’re going. So we’ll continue 
with our project of a united Ireland.’ (Ruane, 2015) 
Unlike Ford, Barry felt that the immediate threat to the Union still resided in Scotland. 
He stated that the issue of Scottish independence ‘hasn’t gone away’  and has only 
been delayed and that the focus of the SNP, the Greens and others in the ‘yes’ 
campaign are still set on Scottish secession. Both Barry and Ruane remarked upon 
the increasingly negative aspect of campaigning employed by the Better Together 
campaign as polling day approached. Barry for instance described the threat of 
many financial institutions and the wider business community to withdraw from an 
independent Scotland as ‘disgraceful’. Ruane placed much emphasis upon the 
lessons that could be drawn from such strategies and specifically those relating to 
‘project fear’. She stated that Sinn Féin could ‘learn from the tactics used by the 
English establishment against the referendum particularly in the last number of days’ 
and the ‘bogus arguments’ they advanced. Thus the ‘demonstration effect’ of the 
referendum (Cartrite, 2012, p.514/515) for the GPNI and Sinn Féin lays in the 
approach employed by those opposing independence and such information will 
undoubtedly inform their own future campaigns either in terms of a second 
independence referendum or a referendum for a united Ireland.  
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By far the most dynamic response to the referendum was provided by Dallat of the 
SDLP. He described it as ‘a watershed in politics’ and felt particularly that the rise in 
Scottish nationalism evident both in the referendum and the imminent General 
Election would ‘have huge ripple effects for er, politics on these islands in the future.’ 
Dallat is clear that the referendum ‘has fundamentally changed the politics on this 
island’ and that the SDLP is ‘actively planning’ new relationships with both the SNP 
and Plaid Cymru alongside their more traditional alliances with parties in the 
Republic of Ireland and Britain. This change in strategy appears to stem from the fact 
that the SDLP are currently languishing well behind Sinn Féin in terms of electoral 
popularity as highlighted by Hepburn & McLoughlin, (2011). Indeed, Dallat appears 
bitter that there has been little ‘real political progress’ of the more progressive and 
inclusive vision of civic nationalism advanced by the SDLP as opposed to Sinn Féin 
‘who have got a very narrow agenda for nationalism and unity’. Dallat describes the 
possibilities of new alliances between the SDLP, SNP and Plaid Cymru as ‘exciting’ 
however; as nationalism in Northern Ireland is currently dominated by Sinn Féin such 
an alliance is unlikely to happen. Nevertheless, Dallat warns unionists and others in 
Northern Ireland who may be ‘in denial’ of the effects of the referendum that the 
resulting rise in Scottish nationalism, particularly in regards to the General Election 
will, in time show ‘that the referendum did affect us.’    
Overall, the interviews suggest that the impact of the Scottish independence 
referendum on Northern Ireland politics has been minimal with the majority of party 
strategies remaining unchanged. This is particularly evident amongst unionists and 
the Alliance Party who clearly feel reassured by the outcome. For the DUP the post-
referendum priority was to solve the numerous crises that the province was 
undergoing, the most significant being the impasse over welfare reform as 
highlighted by Trench, (2014). Sinn Féin remain committed to their long-term 
strategy of a united Ireland and despite the clear opportunity that the referendum 
presented, like the DUP, exhibited a similar inflexibility in party strategy towards it. 
With little change in other aspects of party outlook the dichotomous relationship that 
exists between the two largest parties is therefore unlikely to change following the 
referendum. However, it has been revealed throughout this section that contrary to 
the views of Bell (2014) and Cartrite (2012) the referendum has stimulated Irish 
nationalism particularly within the SDLP who share a more inclusive form of civic 
nationalism with the SNP. However, as assistance from the SDLP was rebuffed by 
the SNP during the referendum campaign, this raises questions as to the likelihood 
of such political alliances and relationships becoming more salient following the 
referendum particularly in light of the divergence which exists in regard to social 
issues in both countries. Nevertheless, the post-referendum political relationship 
between Scotland and Northern Ireland may prove to be significant particularly in 
terms of nationalism and this will be examined in the following section.  
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Section Two 
The significance of the institutional links between Northern Ireland and Scotland 
Introduction 
The previous section reveals that the Scottish independence referendum has 
exerted a subtle dynamic on Northern Ireland politics. Whilst its overall impact has 
been limited for unionists and the APNI given that the constitutional status quo of the 
UK has been maintained, there is also substantial evidence to suggest that the 
referendum has provided a stimulus for Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland. This is 
particularly significant given the continuing rise of Scottish nationalism and the 
likelihood of a second independence referendum as highlighted by Cairney (2015) 
and Jeffery (2015). However, simultaneously, the referendum has also revealed that 
Northern Ireland continues to be peripheral to Scottish politics. In the post-
referendum era the future political relationship between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland is likely to become increasingly significant for Northern Irish elites and 
particularly for unionists and nationalists. That said, the review of the literature 
appears to suggest that the current institutional links between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland are not sufficiently developed to facilitate such relations.  
The following section examines the views of politicians on matters such as IGR, 
political linkage and policy transfer to determine how significant the institutional links 
between both countries are. It argues that IGR between both countries particularly in 
terms of the BIC is largely symbolic for both unionists and nationalists and is 
therefore unlikely to foster any substantial improvement in cooperation or policy 
transfer between the two nations. Party political incongruence also remains very 
much in evidence and despite attempts by Sinn Féin and the SDLP to nurture 
relationships and alliances with the SNP and Plaid Cymru, it is argued that the 
reluctance of the SNP to engage with Northern Ireland’s sectarian politics as 
evidenced in the previous section will mean that such relations are unlikely to 
happen.    
Inter-governmental relations between Northern Ireland and Scotland  
Devolved Inter-governmental relations 
Overall, all respondents that provided comment on the subject of IGR were either 
current or former ministers of government and would therefore have had first-hand 
experience of such relations with Scotland. In terms of devolved IGR the majority of 
comment was provided by representatives of the DUP and Sinn Féin, who, as the 
two largest parties, suppliers of the First and Deputy First Ministers and the larger 
number of ministers, would be more likely to participate in IGR with Scotland as 
opposed to some of the other parties represented in this study. Both the DUP and 
Sinn Féin appear to enjoy regular contact with their Scottish counterparts and their 
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respective relationships with the majority SNP government are amicable. Minister for 
Health Jim Wells remarked that there are regular inter-ministerial meetings between 
Scotland and Northern Ireland particularly in times of crisis and commented: ‘I would 
meet with my colleagues in Scotland constantly about important issues- Ebola being 
the most recent one.’ Moreover, he declares that there is a level of continuing 
cooperation between the two nations on economic matters, stating: ‘I suppose to an 
extent we all gang up on Westminster to demand more money and more attention 
and I think that will continue.’  Wells was also keen to stress that the relationship 
between the DUP and the SNP was on a friendly footing despite the obvious clash in 
political ideology between the two parties. He stated:     
‘The relationship’s excellent at the minute. There’s no acrimony between Alex 
Salmond and Sturgeon or anybody against us. It’s a very amicable 
relationship even though they are nationalists because they are nationalists 
without a military wing. They’re not going to bomb or shoot people into an 
independent Scotland; they’re going to do it through democratic means. So 
therefore, Alex Salmond would be over here regularly to meet the First 
Minister with no problems there at all. A good relationship.’ 
Wells’ comments appear to resonate with Fanning’s (2005) suggestion that there is a 
certain amount of political tension between the DUP and the SNP which may have 
increased if Scotland had gained independence. Indeed, had Scotland voted ‘yes’ 
Wells stated that the relationship ‘would have changed dramatically. It would have 
been completely different.’ He did not elaborate but clearly, IGR between the DUP 
and the SNP is finely balanced. This view is further supported by remarks made by 
Wells regarding the potential outcome of the General Election 2015 where a Labour-
SNP coalition was promoted in the media as being a distinct possibility. He stated:  
‘We will not support the SNP. The SNP are fundamentally an anti-Unionist party...’ 
Such opinion was also held by Allister who remarked upon the ‘considerable dismay 
amongst many Unionists in Northern Ireland at the thought of Miliband being in 
government at the end of a string operated by the Scottish nationalists.’ 
These comments suggest that the relationship between unionists and more 
importantly the DUP and the SNP were tenuous in the aftermath of the referendum. 
Moreover, they appear to contradict Birrell’s (2012) assertion that political parties in 
Northern Ireland have traditionally been unconcerned with the political composition 
of Westminster government. This suggests that political incongruence may well 
become an increasingly significant factor in IGR between the two nations in the 
future as suggested by Swenden & McEwen, (2014).    
Ruane (2015) was clear that as far as Sinn Féin was concerned they were ‘in a new 
era of Irish-British relations.’ She, like Wells evinced a close relationship with 
Scotland, the SNP and to a lesser extent Wales and highlighted the fact that Sinn 
Féin had participated in regular cross-party contact in Scotland. Crucially, for Sinn 
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Féin, the prospect of Scottish independence appears to have resulted in much 
contact as Ruane declared that ‘our people were over as observers for the Scottish 
referendum, we’ve been over since, we will be over so we’d have...you know, be 
talking to all parties in Scotland..’. That said, she also highlighted regular, ongoing 
contact with Scotland ‘on all sorts of issues’ as well as frequent meetings between 
Martin McGuinness, Nicola Sturgeon and Alex Salmond and other Sinn Féin 
colleagues. 
The similar anti-austerity approaches of the SNP and Sinn Féin would indicate the 
presence of some common ground between the two parties. As Ruane pointed out 
‘the Scots are anti-austerity, we’re anti-austerity...’ However, Ruane (2015) is clear 
that their approach to IGR is very much cross-party in nature and does not rest 
solely on a relationship with the SNP. The important point to glean from Ruane’s 
comments is that Sinn Féin, a Republican party with no links to any British political 
party (Birrell, 2012) is actively and somewhat enthusiastically engaging in IGR with 
Scotland (and Wales) following the Scottish independence referendum. With 
unionists becoming increasingly marginalised from Scottish politics, this is likely to 
exacerbate tensions between the DUP and Sinn Féin and will almost certainly impact 
on any future IGR between Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Thus it appears that both the DUP and Sinn Féin are in regular contact with 
representatives of the Scottish government. Both Wells and Ruane highlighted the 
existence of frequent meetings between their First Ministers and Alex Salmond and 
Nicola Sturgeon which supports Birrell’s (2012) argument that bilateral meetings 
between First Ministers are the most common form of devolved IGR between the two 
nations. Birrell’s (2012) view that trilateral meetings are largely infrequent appears to 
be supported by Ford who reveals that his contact with Scotland as Minister for 
Justice is significantly less than with his counterpart in Ireland. He commented: 
‘...once a year I have a meeting with the Scottish Cabinet Secretary and the 
Irish Minister of Justice and Equality. I meet the Irish Justice Minister more 
regularly than that and I meet the Scots occasionally but I mean I have 
described that trilateralism that we all get together and complain about the 
Home Office.’  
The British-Irish Council 
As with devolved IGR, the same three respondents referred directly to the BIC in 
terms of IGR and there was little detail offered regarding its role and influence in the 
relationship between Northern Ireland and Scotland. However, there could be 
discerned a certain amount of positivity towards it in terms of the regularity of 
meetings which was particularly evident from the unionist and non-aligned 
perspective. Wells commented: ‘...the relationship is good erm, we have the 
North/South, er, the East/West Council of the islands as it used to be called where 
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the devolved administrations meet together regularly.’ Regular BIC meetings were 
also highlighted by Minister for Justice David Ford. He stated:  
‘It was erm,...we worked out a complex set of arrangements in 1998 which 
involves power-sharing internally, North/South links, you know, the principle of 
consent applied to the UK link. Erm, and part of that is involved in things like 
the British-Irish council where Ministers from two sovereign states, three 
devolved nations and three crown dependencies meet regularly.’ (Ford, 
2015). 
Former Minister for Education Ruane made it clear that the BIC is an integral part of 
Sinn Féin’s political approach in the post–agreement era which supports Birrell’s 
(2012) view that the party has been willing to participate in East-West institutions. 
She declared: ‘...we have the British-Irish council so we’re a member of that and 
Scotland are a member of that too.’ However, she places little emphasis on its role or 
influences, choosing instead to focus on North/South links which also adds weight to 
Birrell’s (2012) view that nationalist parties gravitate towards institutions such as the 
NSMC. She declared: 
‘Our project...we have the Good Friday Agreement and subsequent 
agreements. We have the Assembly, which is the Assembly here in the North. 
We have the North/South Ministerial Council of which I was a member for four 
years, which is all the ministers on the island, and you have the British-Irish 
Council and then you also have the Human Rights and Equality Commissions. 
We signed up to that whole package not just to the Assembly so I think it’s the 
right way forward. Erm, politically er, we support the North/South institutions 
and are very active in them.’ (Ruane, 2015). 
The lack of detail provided by Wells, Ford and Ruane on the role and output of the 
BIC suggests that its influence on Northern Ireland politics is minimal. Indeed, the 
only positive aspect of the BIC to emerge from the interviews is the regularity of 
meetings which merely suggests that the output of the Council may have moderately 
improved. It appears that the predominant focus for politicians in Northern Ireland in 
terms of IGR, whether unionist, nationalist or non-aligned is with Ireland, North and 
South. This is where the fear originates for unionists and the opportunity presents for 
nationalists. The fact that Sinn Féin are willing to participate in the BIC is significantly 
diminished by Ruane’s comments regarding the NSMC and the clear preference of 
the party to engage with North/South rather than East/West institutions. Therefore, 
for Sinn Féin, the BIC is largely symbolic in terms of IGR. Similarly, Wells’ reference 
to the BIC as the ‘Council of the Isles’ suggests that the symbolic nature of the 
Council endures for unionists.  
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Party political linkages 
According to Birrell (2012) there is total party incongruence between Northern Irish 
and British state-wide parties. At the time of the interviews any links between parties 
amounted to that between the SDLP and the Labour party and more loosely between 
Alliance and the Liberal Democrats. In terms of IGR between Scotland and Northern 
Ireland it can also be seen that the issue of party incongruence is becoming 
increasingly problematic with the rise in Scottish nationalism and this has thrown into 
relief the widening ideological gap that exists between unionist parties in Northern 
Ireland and the SNP. This is evident in the remarks of Barr of the UUP who 
recognises that political incongruence between Scotland and parties on both sides of 
the unionist/nationalist divide are problematic and therefore limit the extent of 
linkage. Barr stated that there is no ‘great political linkage between any of the 
parties. It’s just...we know who to go and see when we need to ask something but no 
one’s really linked.’ However, fringe unionist McNarry disagrees. He feels that ‘there 
is a grave danger’ that Sinn Féin may capitalise on the impetus created by the 
referendum and suggested that they were seeking a ‘Celtic coalition’ alongside the 
SNP and Plaid Cymru in Wales. 
Ordinarily, McNarry’s (2015) claims would be dismissed outright given the obvious 
contrast between Sinn Féin’s particular brand of nationalism as opposed to the more 
progressive outlooks which exist in Scotland and Wales. However, as can be seen 
from the section above, Sinn Féin has had and plans to have a considerable amount 
of contact with political parties in Scotland and Wales and is clear that they would 
like to see both countries gain independence. Moreover, Dallat revealed that the 
SDLP are already considering such an alliance following the referendum. He stated 
that the SDLP ‘will realign with the SNP and also with Plaid Cymru’ bringing ‘a new 
synergy to politics in these islands’. However, once again as Sinn Féin remain by far 
the most popular nationalist party in Northern Ireland, such an alliance is unlikely to 
happen.        
Whilst new relationships and alliances with the SNP and Plaid Cymru appear to be 
desired by both the SDLP and Sinn Féin, it must also be considered that Scottish 
and Welsh nationalists might be unwilling to reciprocate such moves. Indeed, there 
is no evidence to suggest that such alliances were considered although a 
‘progressive alliance’ involving Plaid Cymru, the SNP and the Green Party was 
discussed in the event of a hung parliament following the General Election 2015 
(Mason, 2015). As can be seen from section one the SNP in particular has been 
eager to distance itself from Northern Ireland politics. Barry reiterated the irrelevance 
of Northern Ireland politics to the SNP by describing Northern Ireland as ‘a side-
show and a distraction’ and not on the radar of either Salmond or Sturgeon who now 
have their sights set firmly on Westminster and a second independence referendum. 
He concedes that contact takes place in the BIC and that Sturgeon may visit 
Northern Ireland for the ‘odd meeting’ yet Northern Ireland is ‘not on the agenda’ of 
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the SNP. Moreover, Barry believes that the wariness of unionists towards the SNP 
coupled with the irrelevance of the SDLP and Sinn Féin to Scottish politics has led 
Sturgeon and the SNP to the conclusion that ‘we’re not going to bother with Northern 
Ireland’. 
It is clear that the rise in Scottish nationalism and the holding of the Scottish 
independence referendum has acted as a catalyst for Northern Irish nationalists to 
try and advance their own political agendas. For both Sinn Féin and the SDLP the 
attempt to create new alliances with Scotland and Wales can be seen as being a 
potential vehicle for Irish unity and in the case of the SDLP, to provide a stimulus to 
an otherwise floundering political strategy at home. The potential for either party to 
gain a toe-hold in Scottish politics is unlikely given that the SNP wishes to 
disassociate with Northern Ireland (Bradbury, 2015; Keating, 2014). Simultaneously, 
unionist parties and particularly the DUP are becoming further marginalised from 
Scottish politics and this has been exacerbated by the decimation of fellow unionists 
Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats in the 2015 General Election. 
Indeed, this will also have had an indirect effect on both the SDLP and Alliance who 
share links with the British Labour Party and Liberal Democrats respectively (Birrell, 
2012). The result is that all five major parties in Northern Ireland have become 
further isolated from Scottish politics and with a second independence referendum 
on the horizon the implications of this are significant. That said, of all parties 
represented in this study, the GPNI appears to enjoy a greater level of political 
linkage with Scotland than any other party. Barry stated: 
‘...in fact of all the parties on these islands, the party that we mostly probably 
interact with is probably the Scottish Greens erm, cos [sic] we’re an all-island 
party. We’re one party on the island but the main one that we here in Northern 
Ireland would link in with would be the Scottish in terms of policies and 
common campaigns against Faslane and nuclear dumping and so on.’  
This reflects the relative inclusiveness of the GPNI in the referendum as highlighted 
in section one. However, this is of little significance to the overall impact of IGR with 
Scotland as at the time of writing the party is only represented by two MLAs in the 
Northern Ireland Assembly. 
The experience of devolution: a ‘new’ era in politics? 
Somewhat ironically, respondents representing the two largest parties (Wells and 
Ruane) expressed a high regard for the Scottish devolutionary system. Wells for 
example described the Scots as being ‘much more sensible’ in their approach to 
devolution. He elaborated:  
‘The Scottish have a much more sensible system. They had a voluntary 
coalition of course with the ‘Nats’ and the Greens and Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats and they have a very sensible way with themed ministerships 
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rather than silos. What you have in Scotland is themed ministerships...a 
Minister for children’s services and a Minister for the elderly who garners all of 
the strands of government around that theme about doing what’s best for 
children and the elderly or the vulnerable or whatever and that is an excellent 
model which most democracies should follow. So whether it’s under a Labour 
coalition or a Scottish Nationalist one-party government, it does seem to work 
much better than our model. Much better.’ 
The perception amongst Northern Irish politicians that Scotland’s experience of 
devolution is far more successful and productive than theirs continues into the realm 
of policy-making. On the whole, the majority of respondents felt that Scottish policy-
making had been influential in Northern Ireland politics but the extent of that 
influence was contested. For nationalist Sinn Féin (with similar social policy outlooks 
to the SNP) the Scottish system is seen as being influential on Northern Ireland but 
that there was further scope for greater influence.  Indeed, Ruane highlights the 
constraints of parity in holding back further Scottish influence as highlighted by 
Birrell, (2012). She stated:  
‘Yes. I think... though I’d love to see it influencing it more. I think the Scottish 
have some of the most interesting policies. It’s democratic, I like their 
education system...erm, so yes, definitely. I think the Scottish have an 
interesting way of doing things erm, and they’re not afraid to think outside the 
box and the instinct here in the past and it’s changing a little bit, would have 
been we have to have parity. Parity with England, Scotland, Wales...and the 
minute you break parity, you’re on the road to a united Ireland!’ You know, so, 
whereas, you go ‘well hold on a minute, the Scottish are doing it a bit 
differently and the Welsh are doing it a bit differently so what’s this obsession 
with parity? Why do you want to have parity with something that isn’t working? 
You know, so...yeah I think the Scottish are very interesting, and their policy.’  
Several unionist respondents (Sugden and Barr) highlighted the demographic 
similarities between Scotland and Northern Ireland as being a significant factor when 
considering policy making. Sugden for instance commented:  
‘…when there’re certain policies in Northern Ireland and we’re considering 
them, we always do look towards Scotland and the other devolved institutions. 
Probably more to Scotland than Wales cos [sic] I think it’s more applicable to 
Northern Ireland with the demographics and the makeup of it’.  
Ford agreed that in general terms, policy making in Northern Ireland considers the 
output of other devolved nations and also the Republic of Ireland. However, as 
Minister for Justice, he also highlighted the inherent difficulties that can be 
encountered in applying Scottish policy to what are fundamentally different systems 
in Northern Ireland. He stated:  
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‘When I became Minister, the policies around justice had been whatever they 
did for England and Wales last year the NIO will introduce for Northern Ireland 
this year...even though in justice issues we have a bit of a difficulty because 
the Scottish justice system is so different from ours whereas England and 
Wales and both parts of Ireland have very similar systems. I mean our general 
policy is we look to see what there is to learn from whoever and that 
sometimes can be the Scots even if we cannot apply Scots directly in so 
many cases just because the way the system works but I think across other 
departments it has that same kind of thing that you would look to see what’s 
best and if the Scots can do things slightly differently and it seems to 
work....You know, the nature of our society is more similar to Scotland largely 
than it is to England so there’s that sort of presumption that people will look 
that way as well.’ 
Both Barry and Wells are clear that there has been no influence from Scotland in 
terms of policy making in Northern Ireland and both elites find this lamentable. Wells 
for instance indicates that he has been monitoring the Scottish system closely. He 
declared: ‘the Scottish Nationalists, for all their faults do get their legislation through, 
do have a fairly sensible approach to health and social services which I’ve been 
watching very carefully and their outcomes are very good.’ Similarly, Barry refers to 
the Scots as ‘pioneers’ of policy making and like Wells, feels that their approach to 
health care and social issues has been particularly noteworthy. He commented: 
‘Scotland has been so much more innovative and progressive and moving forward 
whether its health care, tackling poverty and so on.’ Such opinion is also held by 
Dallat who feels that Northern Ireland lags well behind Scotland in terms of effective 
and innovative policy making. Barry makes a further interesting point regarding the 
‘special’ status of Northern Ireland and which perhaps highlights the limitations of the 
extent of policy transfer which can take place between the two countries. Barry 
observed: 
‘It’s about trying to recognise that Northern Ireland is a special case you know. 
We have people here who are on high levels of disability allowance, high 
levels of psychological trauma associated with the conflict. We are not the 
same as any other part of the UK. We do need you know, special 
dispensation in terms of whether it’s the bedroom tax or welfare reform in my 
view shouldn’t go ahead. We should scrap Trident you know rather than 
scrapping people’s DLA but if welfare reform is to er, happen it should 
certainly happen in a much more measured and softer way in Northern Ireland 
than other parts of the UK.’ 
Only one respondent was able to point to any examples of policy learning between 
the two nations which in itself appears to confirm Keating & Cairney’s (2012) 
suggestion that policy transfer is difficult to identify. Community planning was 
highlighted by Barry as having originated in Scotland. He stated: ‘Scotland has led 
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the way on community planning and we thank them for that because now we, in 
Northern Ireland have benefitted from community planning being devolved to local 
government and it’s basically trying to you know, er, echo and ape the Scottish 
system.’ Moreover, considering that politicians were interviewed following the 
Scottish independence referendum which had been the first major British election to 
lower the voting age to 16 (see Mullen, 2014), only Ruane of Sinn Féin appeared to 
acknowledge this fact. She was clear that her party support such changes for 
Northern Ireland and remarked: ‘Oh yeah we’re big supporters of it. Yeah, look there 
(points to a poster on the wall of her office).Yeah I’m big into it.’ However, she goes 
on to explain that any future lowering of the voting age would be an excepted rather 
than a devolved matter thus highlighting the fact that policy innovation is still being 
stifled by constraints. 
Whilst the post-referendum relationship between Scotland and the DUP and Sinn 
Féin appears to be amicable, in terms of IGR, there appears to be a lack of common 
political interest between the two countries with much of the contact between them 
taking place informally at First-Ministerial and ministerial level on matters largely 
restricted to economics. Similarly, the role and influence of the BIC in Northern 
Ireland politics appears to be minimal and therefore is unlikely to be the source of 
any significant policy exchange or innovation between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. Indeed, both Wells and Ruane view the BIC as a largely symbolic 
institution rather than an effective forum for cooperation and policy transfer. Party 
political linkage between Scotland and Northern Ireland also remains minimal as only 
the GPNI appear to share any significant relationship with their sister party in 
Scotland. Indeed, attempts by the SDLP to form an Alliance with the SNP are 
unlikely to succeed given that the SNP are unwilling to associate with Northern 
Ireland politics and as such party political incongruence is likely to remain 
problematic in terms of IGR between both nations for the foreseeable future. 
Section Three  
The significance of non-institutional links between Scotland and Northern Ireland 
The following section explores politicians’ views on the potential significance of the 
non-institutional links between Scotland and Northern Ireland. The literature 
consistently suggests that such links exist predominantly amongst the unionist 
community although as Walker (1995) argues, residual connections could potentially 
remain salient for nationalists. The chapter examines four specific areas identified as 
being of common significance to the two countries; culture and identity, history, 
religion and personal family ties. Further, it explores the extent to which a common 
connection exists between the two countries in the form of sectarianism. The section 
argues that the cultural and historical links between Scotland and Northern Ireland 
are well-established due to migration between the two countries at various times 
throughout history. However, the politicisation of both the Ulster-Scots identity and 
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language appears to be problematic for many participants (including some unionists) 
who struggle to find either cultural or political significance in either. Sectarianism is 
recognised as being problematic for Scotland yet its manifestation (largely in Old 
Firm football matches) is generally considered to be of much less significance than 
that which exists in Northern Ireland.  
Culture, identity and historical migration 
The majority of participants felt that the cultural connection between the two 
countries was of greater significance to unionists and that historical migration was a 
central factor in this. Allister remarked that ‘in historic times there was a lot of 
interplay between Scotland and this part of Ireland’ and that many of the past 
generations in Northern Ireland came from Scotland. He stated that ‘there is a 
cultural affinity with a lot of Scottish things’ in Northern Ireland which manifests in ‘a 
very vibrant Ulster-Scots culture’ and where, in parts of the province ‘you wouldn’t 
know whether you were in Scotland or Northern Ireland.’ Allister added that ‘most of 
those (manifestations), from what I could discern tended to be unionist in orientation 
in Scotland rather than erm, nationalist.’ 
Several respondents viewed the Plantation of Ulster in 1609 as a significant event in 
Ulster-Scots culture which resonates with the views of Holmes (2009). Barry 
remarked that ‘...most of the descendents of the Unionist community here in 
Northern Ireland came from Scotland; the names are the same, there’s a familiarity, 
people go back and forth...’ He added that descendents of Scottish Planters ‘still hold 
their Scottish identity very dear to them...’ Indeed, Sugden agreed that as a result of 
the Ulster Plantation, many unionists ‘would say that they have an Ulster-Scots 
within them’. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, only Barr of the UUP referred to the pre-Roman period of 
migration between Scotland and Ulster as being significant to unionists. He 
remarked that ‘people have been coming back and forth from Scotland for nearly 
2000 years, since anyone worked out how to float a canoe or a bit of log they were 
sailing back and forward.’ He referred to the ancient kingdom of Dalriada ‘which 
linked Scotland and the North East of Ulster’ and which was essentially ‘the same 
piece of land’. Barr draws parallels between Dalriada and the Greek Empire as ‘it 
was a sea-born empire cos [sic] it was easier to sail than it was to go over land...’  
From the nationalist perspective, Dallat also recognised the importance of historical 
migration between the two countries describing the ‘to-ing and fro-ing’ as ‘highly 
significant’. He highlighted several historical connections such as inter-marriage, 
land deals and exchange as well as ‘fights’. He appears to suggest that a 
combination of Irish history and the partition of Ireland almost put an end to the 
connection between Scottish and Irish nationalists which in his view is ‘a sad thing’. 
However, Dallat also feels that following the Scottish independence referendum, this 
connection is ‘reawakening now and that’s good for everybody’. He also noted that 
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large parts of Northern Ireland and Scotland are culturally similar and believes that 
this is reflected in a renewed focus on the part of the tourist boards to promote such 
connections. Clearly, for Dallat the referendum has provided an opportunity for 
Northern Irish nationalists to rekindle their cultural links to Scotland. Indeed, he 
concluded that ‘...we’re developing I think a group of islands that have a lot in 
common and could have done without maybe the history of the past but history’s to 
be learned from’.  
Ulster-Scots culture 
The interviews suggest that there is a variance in politicians’ knowledge of Ulster-
Scots culture. Three respondents (Barry, Barr and Wells) appear to be particularly 
knowledgeable and therefore describe many cultural links between the two 
countries. Others seem less aware and indeed less convinced. Sugden for instance 
feels that Ulster-Scots influences are ‘subtle’ yet is still able to list some links. A wide 
range of Scottish traditions and influences were described including traditional 
Scottish dancing, music, parades and events. Wells for instance highlighted the 
celebration of Burns Night amongst the Protestant community in Northern Ireland. 
Parades were also mentioned particularly in relation to celebrations surrounding the 
12th of July in which ‘people fly the Scottish flags here’ (Sugden, 2015). For Barr, the 
influence of Scottish pipe bands is of particular significance again in relation to 
parades both in Northern Ireland and North America. He was keen to state that these 
pipe bands are a Scottish rather than Irish tradition ‘that we in Ulster have from our 
Presbyterian roots.’      
Additionally, both Barr and Barry referred to a shared mythology between Scotland 
and Northern Ireland. Barr for example talks about the ‘big men of Ulster’ as 
‘fearsome warriors’ who were a class apart whilst Barry highlighted the fact that the 
Giant’s Causeway is believed to be an ancient land bridge between Ireland and 
Scotland and which of course is one of the major tourist attractions in Northern 
Ireland.  
There is also a suggestion from several participants that the Ulster-Scots connection 
may be felt more keenly in certain parts of Northern Ireland than others. Sugden for 
example commented: ‘I do think we have a lot of similarities but it depends on what 
part of Northern Ireland you’re in.’ She did not elaborate however, Barry feels that 
the Ulster-Scots identity is particularly strong in the North East of Northern Ireland 
which is consistent with the views of Walker (1995) and Holmes (2009). Barry 
commented: ‘...an Ulster-Scots identity is very real, particularly in the glens of Antrim 
and the North Antrim coast where people are very close to Scotland. Rathlin Island 
where you know, Robert the Bruce stayed and so on’.  
This view is shared by Wells who also described parts of the North East of Northern 
Ireland as having ‘a huge affinity’ with Scotland. Wells remarked that ‘a large 
proportion of people living in Antrim and East Down came from the Scottish 
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Highlands, in my own constituency (South Down) came from the Scottish Lowlands.’ 
The geographical proximity of Scotland and Northern Ireland therefore appears to be 
a significant factor for some politicians in reinforcing the cultural connection between 
both countries. Wells for instance shared his own personal experience of operating 
boat trips to Scotland from Ballycastle on the Northern coast of Northern Ireland 
declaring that ‘you can see Scotland from Ballycastle’. Barr also stated that ‘...you 
can see Scotland from Northern Ireland. I mean when you go to the North East you 
can see it so it’s not some faraway place from any of us.’ Similarly, Barry pointed out 
that ‘...from where I live in North Down I can see Scotland on a good day and that 
just gives you a sense of how close the islands are and erm, so therefore it just 
underscores the importance of that link between Scotland and Ireland’. Indeed, Barry 
also mentioned that such proximity between the two nations meant that he could ‘get 
Scottish radio fairly easily’ which would also act as cultural reinforcement for those 
living nearest to Scotland. 
It is clear that many unionist respondents and Barry of the GPNI feel that there is a 
strong connection between Scotland and Northern Ireland which exists in the form of 
Ulster-Scots culture. Indeed, as Allister commented: ‘There certainly is an Ulster-
Scots culture, unmistakably so’. Moreover, both Barry and Barr are certain that the 
Ulster-Scots identity ‘is very real’. Even Dallat, albeit somewhat tongue-in-cheek 
declared that it is not a construction. However, it can also be discerned that not all 
politicians are wholly convinced of the authenticity of Ulster-Scots. Sugden for 
example highlighted the politicisation of the culture. She stated: ‘Interestingly 
enough, Ulster-Scots in Northern Ireland doesn’t really have a label- it was given a 
label. It’s only since 1998 you know one side has to have a culture and we have to 
have ours that a label’s been put onto it.’ Such opinion is also held by Ford who also 
recognises a cultural connection with Scotland but is unsure of its authenticity. Ford 
declared:  
‘I’m not sure it’s an identity...teaching children about their cultural background 
and introducing them to the poetry of not just Burns but some of the weaver 
poets of County Antrim is one thing and it’s an entirely legitimate part of 
cultural background but I think you can overstate that and I think there are a 
lot of campaigners who are significantly overstating it.’ 
This suggests that despite the historical links of Scottish migration to Northern 
Ireland during the Plantation, some politicians, including unionists still question the 
authenticity of the Ulster-Scots culture. Indeed, for some, the politicisation of the 
identity appears to have greatly reduced the significance of the culture for many 
politicians in Northern Ireland.   
Religion and sectarianism 
Several participants (Barry, Wells and Barr) identified a religious link between 
Scotland and Northern Ireland in the form of the Orange Order. This was mainly 
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evident in the responses of Wells and Barr as Barry made only a passing reference 
to the fact that ‘Orange parades happen in Glasgow and Edinburgh and they happen 
here as well.’ Both mainstream unionists referred to a strong Orange Order presence 
in Western Scotland with Wells also acknowledging the interchange between Orange 
Order members particularly with regard to parades. Wells commented: ‘...the Orange 
Order is very strong in Western Scotland and in Northern Ireland and they would 
come over for our twelfth and we’d go over for their first Saturday in July...’ Barr was 
equally certain of this cultural connection and stated ‘it’s a big thing particularly in the 
West of Scotland, particularly in greater Glasgow. We also have presences in 
Ayrshire and Fife and different parts of Scotland. It’s part of their culture. It’s there.’  
In terms of the religious connection between the two countries, Barr was the only 
participant to talk in any great length on the subject. He feels that the Presbyterian 
connection between Scotland and Northern Ireland is linked to the Plantation which 
is consistent with the view of Holmes (2009). Barr remarked: ‘I mean a significant 
portion of the people of Northern Ireland are of Scottish extraction, the Presbyterian 
church is the largest church in Northern Ireland in terms of membership...’ Moreover, 
Barr proudly highlighted the role of the descendents of these Ulster-Scots in various 
battles and wars throughout history which, according to Holmes (2009) is reflective 
of the classic Ulster-Scots narrative. He declared:   
‘Erm, if you look at the history of Northern Ireland and you look at what 
happened with the plantation from 1607 onward there were literally tens of 
thousands of us landed here. The Presbyterians were the ‘shock troops’. They 
basically took the hits for that century, they fought at the Derry they fought at 
the Boyne and once they got beyond it erm, the Anglican church started to 
assert itself again and the Presbyterians became sort of victims of the 
Anglican church and by 1720 we were all getting on the boats and going to 
America. So we ended up in Washington’s army and these were people who 
were fighters, they were strong, they were tough, they were exactly the sort of 
people you would put on a frontier because they were on a frontier here in 
1609. They were on a frontier in America and these were the guys that 
pushed West and South into America. They were the Indian fighters, you 
know it was Davy Crockett all those guys- all Ulster-Scots names...’ 
Perhaps as a reflection of the contentious debate which currently surrounds the 
subject of sectarianism in Scotland, only half of respondents referred to the issue. Of 
these, (Wells, Barr, McNarry, Barry and Dallat) the majority of comments were brief 
and merely acknowledged the existence of sectarianism both in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. Indeed, such a response is typified by Barry who, when asked 
whether he felt that the two countries were culturally similar replied: ‘Er yeah 
absolutely. I think you know, whether it’s the sectarianism between Protestants and 
Catholics...’ Dallat offered little further detail in his remarks. He stated: ‘I think that 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have similar challenges and they have similar 
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problems. I mean certainly sectarianism within Northern Ireland is well known, 
maybe it’s not so well known in Scotland and maybe it’s not so well addressed.’ 
Football was used as an analogy by both Wells and Barr to underscore the 
importance of religious affiliation to the game in Scotland and particularly Glasgow. 
Wells for instance highlighted the fact that ‘more people go on the ferry every 
Saturday or Sunday to watch Celtic or Rangers than watch all of the football games 
in Northern Ireland.’ For Wells the significance of the ‘Old Firm’ rivalry is clearly a 
reflection of Northern Irish sectarianism as he stated that ‘half of Northern Ireland 
supports Glasgow Celtic and the other half (including myself) supports Glasgow 
Rangers’. He added that ‘if you’re born in one community you’re naturally a Rangers 
supporter and if you’re born in the other...I mean I’ve never met a Catholic Rangers 
supporter and I’ve only met one Protestant Celtic supporter...’  
Similarly, Barr also used the sport as an analogy to describe and explain the 
outcome of the Scottish independence referendum. He essentially saw the hostility 
between Glasgow Celtic and Glasgow Rangers as being reflected in the ‘yes’/’no’ 
vote. He noted that many areas of Glasgow which would have traditionally been 
seen as Labour and therefore unionist strongholds voted for independence and 
prompted him to state that ‘my God, it’s a Celtic vote. It’s Celtic, they voted to take 
the flag down’.  
Barr goes further to suggest that the violence which erupted in Glasgow’s George 
Square following the referendum result was sectarian in nature. He remarked 
that‘...faces were being recognised from football trouble you know, it was like this is 
not a good scene, this is definitely splitting down...’ He then draws a direct 
comparison between the violence which erupted in George Square and that which 
occurred during Northern Ireland’s ‘troubles’. Moreover, he appears to suggest that 
whilst sectarianism is considered as being somewhat normal for Old Firm football 
matches, its appearance in mainstream Scottish politics is novel and also worrying. 
Barr stated:  
‘...and then when the ‘no’ campaign won what was in the square was literally 
something out of here in 1969. It was just...I mean most Scots were 
completely... that angle’s never emerged in Scottish politics ever even in the 
horrendous days here. It never ever touched the Scots. Bit of football, no 
problem, Rangers/Celtic fine. That was the first time mainstream politics had 
gone that way.’ 
Ulster-Scots Language 
The majority of respondents from across the political spectrum (Allister, Barr, 
Sugden, Wells, Barry, Ford and Dallat) agree with much of academia that the current 
status of Ulster-Scots is that of a dialect rather than a language. Fringe Unionist Jim 
Allister summed up the overall mood by stating: ‘I’m not sure it’s a language. There 
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are dialects and other things but er, to piece that up to call it a language I think is 
stretching it a bit quite frankly’ (laughs).  
With the exception of Wells and Barr, the majority of these respondents also 
appeared to suggest that Ulster-Scots had become politicised as a result of the GFA 
which supports the theory of McCall (2002). Whilst Ford recognised that ‘there 
clearly is a cultural issue’ he remarked that it had been ‘used by some people to be 
quite a significant political issue’. Moreover, he was equally blunt on the status of 
Ulster-Scots stating that because ‘nationalists have got the Irish language, we have 
to pretend that Ulster-Scots is a complete language and so on and so forth. It’s not, 
it’s a dialect.’ Ford’s perception that the significance of Ulster-Scots has become 
politically exaggerated is shared by Barry who also points out that ‘very few people 
speak it’ despite political promotion by the DUP and also considerable financial 
backing. He referred to Ulster-Scots as ‘a symbol of a sense of separate identity and 
a link with Scotland’ for unionists yet believes that the weight given to Ullans as a 
language cannot be sustained as it is a dialect. That said, Barry is clear that the 
negativity attached to the language does not detract from the authenticity of the 
Ulster-Scots culture or identity.  
Numerous respondents appeared to find the subject of the Ulster-Scots language as 
being amusing. For instance, the remarks of Allister outlined above are punctuated 
with laughter. This type of reaction was common to politicians from across the 
political spectrum. Both Sugden and Ford described Ulster-Scots language as ‘funny’ 
and therefore something of a joke. Sugden for instance remembered in her youth 
‘taking the hand out of’ inhabitants of a nearby town ‘because they spoke funny’. 
Only later in life did she realise that this ‘really thick accent was an Ulster-Scots 
dialect’. Ford’s comments also appear to support McCall’s (2002, p.203) view that 
Ulster-Scots is perceived as being ‘backward, premodern and rural’. He described 
joking with his wife’s relations (who hail from rural County Antrim and therefore use 
Ulster-Scots) ‘that they use funny farming terms for things’ and that such an 
approach is normal and ‘one of those things you joke about.’ 
Dallat also remarked that he currently lives in a plantation town and joked about the 
Ulster-Scots dialect being difficult to decipher. However, he also points to the 
existence of ‘pockets’ of Ulster-Scots in the Republic of Ireland which appears to 
support the views of Dowling (2007) and Stapleton & Wilson (2004) that the 
language is not exclusive to unionism and Protestantism. This raises further 
questions over the effectiveness of its use in the Ulster-Scots cultural revival as 
highlighted by McCall (2002). 
The comments of Allister and Sugden already suggest that there is a continuance in 
unionist scepticism towards Ulster-Scots as put forward by McCall (2002). Indeed, 
the responses of Wells and Barr further support such a stance. For instance, when 
asked to comment on the cultural similarities between Northern Ireland and 
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Scotland, Wells of the DUP chose to highlight the linguistic link between the two 
countries. However, Wells was clear in his response that he has no personal 
experience of Ulster-Scots and more importantly, identifies the status of Ulster-Scots 
as a dialect and not a language. He commented: ‘...so yes there’s a huge 
affinity...Ulster-Scots dialect which I don’t speak but some MLAs are very good at.’  
Barr of the UUP is perhaps even more dismissive of Ullans, appearing to question its 
place within a modern 21st century Northern Ireland. This is particularly interesting 
given that the revival of the Ulster-Scots language and identity was championed by 
former UUP elite Ian Adamson. Barr declared:     
‘The language we’re hearing now, there’s no point in trying to breathe life into 
something that’s gone. Erm we, in the 21st century it’s the BBC, the national 
broadcaster, I mean we trade with Europe, we trade with America and we 
trade with the world and our own language is English and er, whilst it’s fine to 
respect your culture and the past you have to say, are we going to, you know 
look forward or look back? Let’s celebrate the past and cherish it. For the 
enthusiasts who want to speak it, so be it, there’s no point in erm...I don’t see 
anything...I mean go to Glasgow, go to Edinburgh and they’re not speaking 
what Burns spoke and wrote, they’re speaking modern English in local dialect. 
The language aspect of Ulster-Scots, it’s there but erm, I don’t see it as 
anything other than a tenet of the English language which is what we speak 
here. Then you recognise the Irish language, well, again they can make their 
case.’ 
Family ties 
Only a small number of participants reported the existence of actual family ties with 
Scotland. Wells stated: ‘...lots of family contacts. I have a brother for instance living 
in Dunfermline...’ Similarly, Dallat remarked: ‘...I have a daughter lives in Glasgow for 
several years...’ Interestingly, both respondents qualified these Scottish ties with 
personal experience of visiting the country. Wells for instance stated that ‘we would 
holiday there’ whilst Dallat indicated that ‘I’ve also been a visitor to that part of the 
world, cos [sic] I absolutely love the islands...’ This personal experience of Scotland 
is shared by Barry as a result of his university education and is used as grounds to 
accentuate the links between the two nations.  He stated: ‘ my PhD is from Glasgow 
for example so I know Scotland quite well and in many ways, the Irish, not just the 
Northern Irish, the Irish as a whole and the Scots have a lot in common.’  
Despite a lack of actual family ties with Scotland, Barr, when questioned on the 
potential loss of Scotland following the independence referendum referred numerous 
times to the Scots in general as ‘family’. He declared: ‘obviously as we would say, as 
more than friends, as family, we wanted them to stay...’ Indeed, he went on to 
describe the Union without Scotland as being ‘like a family bereavement quite 
literally’. Barr, like Wells, Dallat and Barry evinced the close relationship between 
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both countries in terms of education and travel. He added: ‘Some go to school there 
or go to university there or family holidays there so it’s not some remote place for 
us...’ Such comments appear to resonate with Delaney’s (2007) view that the post-
war migration network between Scotland and Northern Ireland retained significant 
links to the homeland and that the proximity of both countries keeps these networks 
fluid and open. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
Chapter Five: Conclusions 
By utilising primary data collected from semi-structured interviews with senior 
politicians in Northern Ireland, this study examined their perceptions of Scotland’s 
political and cultural influence on the province. These interviews and therefore the 
data were grounded in academic theory. The study concentrated on three main 
areas of research. As the initial theme of the project, it began by examining the 
reactions of politicians to the Scottish independence referendum before moving on to 
assess their views on the significance of the institutional and non-institutional links 
between the two countries. By being underpinned by academic theory and informed 
by primary data, this study addresses significant gaps in scholarship not just with 
regard to the Scottish independence referendum but more widely in the complex 
political and cultural relationship which exists between Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. 
The Scottish independence referendum was a significant event for Northern Ireland’s 
politicians. However, despite the considerable implications of Scottish independence 
for the region, all political parties in Northern Ireland were largely uninvolved in the 
referendum campaign and wider debate. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, 
there was a perception amongst elites that any political interference on their part 
would be unhelpful to their Scottish counterparts on either side of the campaign. 
Respondents representing both the DUP and UUP; Sinn Féin and the GPNI reported 
being unwilling to become overtly involved in the campaign choosing instead to let 
the democratic nature of the referendum unfold and to allow the Scots determine 
their own future.  
Secondly, some parties were excluded from participation in the referendum. Ford 
reported that the non-aligned and progressive Alliance Party had been discouraged 
from becoming involved by the Scottish Liberal Democrats. Similarly, Dallat of the 
more moderate nationalist SDLP stated that his party had approached the SNP with 
an offer of assistance prior to the referendum and had been rebuffed. The reluctance 
of parties allied to both the Better Together and Yes Scotland campaigns to engage 
with the more moderate parties in Northern Ireland indicates that any such exclusion 
would extend to all parties in the region and particularly the more extreme DUP and 
Sinn Féin. However, the primary data is inconclusive as to whether these parties 
independently adopted a cautious approach to the campaign or whether such 
approaches were a result of prior exclusion by Scotland or simply because other 
parties had been rebuffed. Therefore, Bradbury’s (2015) claim that unionists and 
nationalists sought to capitalise on the referendum to advance their own long-term 
agendas may well be true but is beyond the scope of the interview data. Indeed, this 
gap may provide an opportunity for further study particularly in light of the possibility 
of a second independence referendum. The important point is that all parties in 
Northern Ireland were disengaged from the referendum campaign and this was 
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either as a direct or indirect result of Scotland’s will to disassociate with Northern 
Ireland’s sectarian politics. 
As a result of such exclusion, the impact of the referendum on Northern Ireland 
politics was minimal. With the exception of the SDLP, participants representing all 
parties reported little or no change in party outlook or strategy following the 
referendum result. Wells made it clear that the DUP were prioritising the numerous 
political crises occurring in the region above all else and was keen to move on from 
events in Scotland. Similarly, Ruane remained focused on Sinn Féin’s long-term 
political project of a united Ireland. As such their dichotomous relationship is unlikely 
to change following the referendum. That said, contrary to the views of Bell (2014) 
and Cartrite, (2012) the referendum has stimulated Irish nationalism in Northern 
Ireland and could be potentially problematic for the region particularly in light of a 
second independence referendum. This was recognised by Allister and also McNarry 
who suggested that Sinn Féin may seek to capitalise on the impetus generated by 
the referendum by forming a ‘Celtic Coalition’ with fellow nationalists Plaid Cymru 
and the SNP. There is no evidence to suggest that such an alliance has been 
considered however, Dallat reported a fundamental change in his party’s strategy 
which would involve the realignment of the SDLP with both the SNP and Plaid 
Cymru. That said, given the inferior electoral position of the party in relation to Sinn 
Féin and the unwillingness of the SNP to engage with Northern Ireland’s sectarian 
politics this is unlikely to happen. In summary, the interaction of Northern Irish 
politicians with the referendum has been minimal partly due to their reluctance to 
become involved in the campaign and perhaps more importantly, because of the 
unwillingness of Scottish parties to include them. 
Due to devolution, there are distinctive sets of arrangements that allow for 
institutional, political and inter-governmental relations between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland which cover a range of areas. However, despite the often elaborate 
institutional nature of the frameworks governing these relationships, they are not that 
significant to Northern Ireland’s politicians. Whilst the post-referendum relationship 
between Scotland and the DUP and Sinn Féin appears to be amicable, in terms of 
IGR, there appears to be a lack of common political interest between the two 
countries with much of the contact between them taking place informally at First-
Ministerial and ministerial level on matters largely restricted to economics. Similarly, 
the role and influence of the BIC in Northern Ireland politics appears to be minimal 
and therefore is unlikely to be the source of any significant policy exchange or 
innovation between Northern Ireland and Scotland. Indeed, both Wells and Ruane 
view the BIC as a largely symbolic institution rather than an effective forum for 
cooperation and policy transfer.  
Ironically, representatives of the DUP and Sinn Féin felt that the Scottish 
devolutionary system is much better than that which exists in Northern Ireland,   
particularly in terms of policy making. Indeed, many participants perceive Scottish 
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policy making to be innovative and progressive. Several unionists highlighted the fact 
that Northern Ireland does look to Scotland in terms of policy making due to the 
demographic similarities between the two countries. However, others remarked upon 
the numerous factors which may constrain policy transfer such as the difference in 
systems, (Ford) the uniqueness of post-conflict Northern Ireland (Barry) and the 
retention of certain powers by Westminster (Ruane). With the exception of 
community planning, a general lack of awareness of all participants to examples and 
instances of policy transfer between the two countries underlines the relative 
insignificance of such issues to politicians in Northern Ireland.   
Party political linkage between Scotland and Northern Ireland also remains minimal 
as only the GPNI appear to share any significant relationship with their sister party in 
Scotland. The post-referendum stimulation of Irish nationalism appears to have 
prompted Sinn Féin and the SDLP to nurture relationships with both the SNP and 
Plaid Cymru. Dallat revealed that such an alliance is currently being considered by 
the SDLP as an attempt to get back on electoral terms with Sinn Féin. However, with 
the SNP’s lack of interest in Northern Ireland politics it is likely that any advances 
made by the SDLP in terms of forming such an alliance would be rejected as they 
were in relation to participation in the referendum campaign. Thus it must be 
concluded that there will be a continuance in mainstream party political incongruence 
between both nations for the foreseeable future ensuring that party political linkage 
remains a relatively insignificant connection between Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
There are well-established cultural and historical links between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland due to migration between the two countries at different historical junctures. 
Most participants consider the cultural connection between the two countries to be of 
greater significance to the unionist community and that historical migration during the 
Plantation of Ulster appears to be central to this relationship. There is a distinct 
variance in participants’ knowledge of Ulster-Scots culture. Barry, Barr and Wells 
agree that the Ulster-Scots culture is felt more keenly in the North East of Northern 
Ireland which is consistent with the views of Holmes (2009) and Walker (1995). This 
is largely due to the fact that the first Planters from Scotland arrived in this area and 
thus created the first Scottish colony there. Moreover, there is also a perception 
amongst elites that the geographical proximity of the North East of Northern Ireland 
to Scotland continues to reinforce the cultural connection between the two countries 
as these same respondents consistently stressed the ability to be able to see 
Scotland from this part of Northern Ireland.           
The authenticity of the Ulster-Scots identity appears to divide the opinion of 
politicians. Indeed, unionists, in reaction to fears of an increased role for Dublin 
constructed for themselves an identity in opposition to political and cultural Irishness 
that drew on the historical links between Scotland and Northern Ireland to bolster 
their Britishness. However, despite this, and despite a significant Irish nationalist 
diaspora in Scotland, these too are not all that significant in either community and 
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there is no real purchase in them politically in contemporary terms. Similarly, many 
participants feel that Northern Ireland retains a linguistic connection to Scotland. 
However, despite Ulster-Scots recognition as an official language under the terms of 
The Agreement, most view it as a dialect and not a language. Essentially, due to the 
politicisation of Ulster-Scots many cross-party elites appear not to take the language 
seriously. As was found in McCall’s (2002) earlier study, Unionist scepticism towards 
it still remains apparent and is epitomised in the response of Barr who challenges its 
current relevance in a modern, forward-thinking nation. Indeed, there appears to 
have been a reversal of UUP opinion on the issue of Ulster-Scots language which is 
now once again viewed as nothing more ‘than a tenet of the English language’ (see 
Nic Craith, 2001). Therefore, overall it can be said that the significance of Ulster-
Scots language is declining in Northern Ireland and thus it is not a significant factor 
in the cultural link between both countries. 
Historical migration has led to some commonality in terms of social phenomena such 
as sectarianism, but these play out in very different ways in both regions. Both Wells 
and Barr identified a link between Scotland and Northern Ireland in the form of Old 
Firm football matches which are well patronised by both sets of supporters in 
Northern Ireland. Wells was particularly clear that religious affiliation is central to the 
fanbase of both Glasgow Rangers and Glasgow Celtic. Football was also used by 
Barr as an analogy to describe the outcome of the Scottish independence 
referendum and the subsequent violence which erupted in Glasgow’s George 
Square. Essentially, he sees the hostility between Rangers and Celtic as being 
reflected in the yes/no vote. Ultimately, only mainstream unionists identified a 
significant link between the two countries in terms of sectarianism and this 
connection exists largely within the confines of Scottish football. Barr’s suggestion 
that sectarianism has extended into the realm of Scottish politics is perhaps more 
significant and raises the potential for further study, particularly as the issue of 
Scottish independence still remains salient today. 
Recommendations 
As a Master’s project, this study was limited in the availability of time and resources 
able to complete it. As a result, although nine interviews were conducted with a 
range of cross-party politicians representing all the major parties in Northern Ireland, 
only one representative from each party was interviewed. The resulting data 
therefore lacks depth in terms of party politics and is limited to the perceptions of 
individual politicians. That said, the study has still identified specific areas of 
research which could be a useful starting point for further study. For instance, it has 
been discovered that the lack of engagement of political parties with the referendum 
campaign was a result of Scotland’s reluctance to engage with Northern Ireland’s 
sectarian politics. However, Bradbury’s (2015) argument that unionists and 
nationalists sought to capitalise on the referendum to advance their own long-term 
agendas (with unionists believing they could lead the case for the Union) is beyond 
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the scope of the interview data and remains a salient issue whilst a second 
independence referendum remains on the political agenda of the SNP.  
The apparent reversal of UUP policy on the issue of Ulster-Scots language presents 
another opportunity for further study as does Barr’s remarks regarding the presence 
of sectarianism in mainstream Scottish politics following the outcome of the 
referendum result. Overall the study shows that Northern Ireland remains firmly 
entrenched in ethno-national politics. Thus, if the ties between Scotland and the 
region are to be developed then it is not for the political elite to develop such 
connections. Rather, civil society organisations could be the conduit for drawing a 
positive link between constituent parts of the UK.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64 
 
References 
Adamson, I. (1982). The Identity of Ulster: The Land, the Language and the People. 
Belfast: Pretani Press. 
Adamson, I. (1991). The Ulster People: Ancient, Medieval and Modern. Bangor: 
Pretani Press. 
Allister, J. Interview by Brook, J. (1.30pm, 21st April 2015). 
Anon, (2014). ‘Scottish Referendum: Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness Calls for 
Northern Ireland Border Poll Following Scotland Result.’ Available at: 
https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/scotland-independence-vote/scottish-
referendum-  
Aughey, A. (1989). Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
London: C.Hurst & Co. 
Aughey, A. (2001). Nationalism, Devolution and the Challenge to the United 
Kingdom State. London: Pluto Press. 
Aughey, A. (2014). ‘Northern Ireland: 20 years on’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
37, (9), pp.815-823.  
Bairner, A. & Shirlow, P. (1998). ‘Loyalism, Linfield and the Territorial Politics of 
Soccer Fandom in Northern Ireland.’ Space & Polity, 2, (2), pp.163-177.  
Barr, S. Interview by Brook, J. (12.30pm, 20th April 2015). 
Barry, J. Interview by Brook, J. (10.30am, 12th October 2015). 
Bell, C. (2014). ‘Scottish ballot is not stoking nationalism in Northern Ireland.’ 
Available at: https://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog/ Last accessed 
6/09/2017. 
Bell, D.N.F. (2015). ‘Territorial Finance and the Future of Barnett.’ The Political 
Quarterly, 86, (2), pp.209-216. 
Bennie, L., Denver, D., Mitchell, J. & Bradbury, J. (2001). Harbingers of New 
Politics? The Characteristics and Attitudes of Candidates in the Scottish Parliament 
Elections, 1999.’ British Elections & Parties Review, 11, (1), pp.23-45. 
Birrell, D. (2010). ‘Public Sector Reform in Northern Ireland: Policy Copying or a 
Distinctive Model of Public Sector Modernization?’ Public Money & Management, 30, 
(2), pp.109-116.  
Birrell, D. (2012). ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Political Parties in Northern 
Ireland.’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 14, pp.270-284. 
 65 
 
Birrell, D. & Heenan, D. (2013). ‘Policy Style and Governing without Consensus: 
Devolution and Education Policy in Northern Ireland.’ Social Policy & Administration, 
47, (7), pp. 765-782. 
Bogdanor, V. (1999). ‘The British-Irish Council and Devolution.’ Government & 
Opposition, 34, (3), pp.287-298. 
Bogdanor, V. (2010). ‘The West Lothian Question’. Parliamentary Affairs, 63, (1), 
pp.156-172. 
Bradbury, J. (2015, March/April). The Rest of the UK, UK Central Government and 
the Politics of the Post-Scottish Referendum Constitutional Settlement. Paper 
presented at the UK Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Sheffield. 
Bradbury, J. & Mitchell, J. (2001). ‘Devolution: New Politics for Old?’ Parliamentary 
Affairs, 54, pp.257-275. 
Bradley, J.M. (2006). ‘Sport and the Contestation of Ethnic Identity: Football and 
Irishness in Scotland.’ Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies, 32, (7), pp.1189-1208.  
Bratberg, O. (2010). ‘Multi-level Parties in Process: Scottish and Welsh MEPs and 
their Home Parties.’ West European Politics, 33, (4), pp.851-869. 
Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology.’ Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3, (2), pp.77-101. 
Brewer, J.D. (1992). ‘Sectarianism and Racism and their Parallels and Differences.’ 
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 15, (3), pp.352-364. 
Bruce, S. (1986). God Save Ulster! The Religion and Politics of Paisleyism. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bruce, S. (1994). The Edge of the Union. The Ulster Loyalist Political Vision. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bruce, S. (2000). Comparing Scotland and Northern Ireland. In T.M. Devine (Ed.), 
Scotland’s Shame? Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland. (pp.135-142). 
Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company Ltd.  
Bruce, S., Glendinning, T., Paterson, I. & Rosie, M. (2004). Sectarianism in Scotland. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd. 
Cairney, P. (2008). ‘Has Devolution Changed the British Policy Style?’ British 
Politics, 3, (3), pp.350-372.  
Cairney, P. (2015). ‘Scotland’s Future Political System.’ The Political Quarterly, 86, 
(2), pp.217-225. 
 66 
 
Cartrite, B. (2012). ‘The impact of the Scottish independence referendum on 
ethnoregionalist movements in the British Isles.’ Commonwealth & Comparative 
Politics, 50, (4), pp.512-534. 
Coakley, J. (2011). ‘The Challenge of Consociationalism in Northern Ireland’. 
Parliamentary Affairs, 64, (3), pp.473-493. 
Coakley, J. (2014). ‘British Irish Institutional Structures: Towards a New 
Relationship.’ Irish Political Studies, 29, (1), pp.76-97. 
Cochrane, F. (1994). ‘Any Takers? The Isolation of Northern Ireland.’ Political 
Studies, 42, (3), pp.378-395.  
Cochrane, F. (2013) Northern Ireland: The Reluctant Peace. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Crowley, T. (2006). ‘The Political Production of a Language: The Case of Ulster-
Scots.’ Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 16, (1), pp.23-35. 
Cumbers, A. (2014). ‘The Scottish Independence Referendum and the dysfunctional 
economic geography of the UK’ In Sharp, J., Cumbers, A., Painter, J. & Wood, N. 
(Eds), Deciding whose future? Challenges and opportunities of the Scottish 
Independence Referendum 2014 for Scotland and beyond. Political Geography, 41, 
(pp.33-36). 
Dallat, J. Interview by Brook, J. (9.00am, 21st April 2015).  
Dardanelli, P. & Mitchell, J. (2014). ‘An Independent Scotland? The Scottish National 
Party’s Bid for Independence and its Prospects’. The International Spectator: Italian 
Journal of International Affairs, 49, (3), pp.88-105. 
Delaney, E. (2007). The Irish in Post-War Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Delaney, E. (2014). Migration and Diaspora. In: Jackson, A. (Ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Modern Irish History (pp.126-148). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Deschouwer, K. (2003). ‘Political Parties in Multi-Layered Systems.’ European Urban 
and Regional Studies, 10, (3), pp.213-226. 
Devine, T. M. (Ed.). (2000). Scotland’s Shame? Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern 
Scotland. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company Ltd.  
Donnelly, C. & Osborne, R.D. (2005). ‘Devolution, Social Policy and Education: 
Some Observations from Northern Ireland.’ Social Policy & Society, 4, pp.147-156.  
Dowling, M.W. (2007). ‘Confusing Culture and Politics: Ulster Scots Culture and 
Music’. New Hibernia Review, 11, (3), pp.51-80. 
 67 
 
Dunleavy, P. (2005). ‘Facing up to Multi-Party Politics: How Partisan Dealignment 
and PR Voting Have Fundamentally Changed Britain’s Party Systems.’ 
Parliamentary Affairs, 58, (3), pp.503-532. 
Fanning, R. (2005). The British-Irish Relationship: From Antagonism to Alliance. In 
Coakley, J., Laffan, B. & Todd, J. (Eds.), Renovation or Revolution? New Territorial 
Politics in Ireland and the United Kingdom. (pp.132-146). Dublin: University College 
Dublin Press. 
Farrington, C. (2001). ‘Ulster Unionist Political Divisions in the Late Twentieth 
Century’. Irish Political Studies, 16, (1), pp.49-71. 
Farrington, C. & Walker, G. (2009). ‘Ideological content and institutional frameworks: 
Unionist identities in Northern Ireland and Scotland.’ Irish Studies Review, 17, (2), 
pp.135-152.  
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research’. 
Qualitative Inquiry, 12, (2), pp.219-245. 
Ford, D. Interview by Brook, J. (3.00pm, 20th April 2015). 
Gallacher, J. & Raffe, D. (2012). ‘Higher education policy in post-devolution UK: 
More convergence than divergence?’ Journal of Education Policy, 27, (4), pp.467-
490.  
Geoghegan, P. (2008). ‘Multiculturalism and Sectarianism in Post-agreement 
Northern Ireland’. Scottish Geographical Journal, 124, (2-3), pp.185-191. 
Gerring, J. (2004). ‘What is a Case Study and What is it Good For?’ American 
Political Science Review, 98, (2), pp.341-354. 
Graham, B. (1998). ‘Contested images of place among Protestants in Northern 
Ireland.’ Political Geography, 17,(2), pp.129-144.  
Gray, A.M. & Birrell, D. (2012). ‘The structures of the NHS in Northern Ireland: 
Divergence, policy copying and policy deficiency.’ Public Policy & Administration, 28, 
(3), pp.274-289.  
Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. In 
N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), The Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp.105-
117). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Hayton, R. (2015). ‘The Coalition and the Politics of the English Question.’ The 
Political Quarterly, 86, (1), pp.125-132. 
Hazell, R. (2006). (Ed.) The English Question. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
 68 
 
Hazell, R. & Sandford, M. (2015). ‘English Question or Union Question? Neither has 
Easy Answers.’ The Political Quarterly, 86, (1), pp.16-23. 
Henderson, A., Jeffery, C. & Lineira, R. (2015). ‘National Identity or National 
Interest? Scottish, English and Welsh Attitudes to the Constitutional Debate.’ The 
Political Quarterly, 86, (2), pp.257-280. 
Hepburn, E. & McLoughlin, P.J. (2011). ‘Celtic Nationalism and Supranationalism: 
Comparing Scottish and Northern Ireland Party Responses to Europe’. The British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13, pp.383-399. 
Hermann, T. (2001). The Impermeable Identity Wall: The Study of Violent Conflict by 
“Insiders” and “Outsiders”. In M. Smyth & G. Robinson (Eds.), Researching Violently 
Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues (pp.77-91). London: Pluto 
Press. 
Holmes, A.R. (2009). ‘Presbyterian Religion, Historiography and Ulster Scots 
Identity, c.1800 to 1914.’ The Historical Journal, 52, (3), pp.615-640.  
Hopkin, J. & Bradbury, J. (2006). ‘British Statewide Parties and Multilevel Politics.’ 
Publius, 36, (1), pp.135-152. 
Horgan, G.W. (2003). ‘Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations: The Emergence 
of Intergovernmental Affairs Agencies.’ Public Policy & Administration, 18, (3), pp.12-
24. 
Horgan, G. & Gray, A.M. (2012). ‘Devolution in Northern Ireland: A lost opportunity?’ 
Critical Social Policy, 32, (3), pp.467-478. 
Horowitz, D.L. (2002). ‘Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources of 
an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus’. British Journal of Political Science, 32, (2), 
pp.193-220. 
Hough, D. & Jeffery, C. (2003). ‘Regional Elections in Multi-Level Systems.’ 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 10, (3), pp.199-212. 
Jeffery, C. (2009). ‘Devolution in the United Kingdom: Problems of a Piecemeal 
Approach to Constitutional Change.’ Publius, 39, (2), pp.289-313. 
Jeffery, C. (2015). ‘Constitutional Change Without End?’ The Political Quarterly, 86, 
(2), pp. 275-278. 
Keating, M. (2005). ‘Policy convergence and divergence in Scotland under 
devolution.’ Regional Studies, 39, (4), pp.453-463. 
Keating, M. (2014). ‘What would Scottish independence mean for Ireland?’ Available 
at: https://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/blog Last accessed 10/09/2017. 
 69 
 
Keating, M. (2015). ‘The Scottish Independence Referendum and After’. Magazine of 
Autonomic and Federal Studies, (21), pp.73-98. 
Keating, M. & Cairney, P. (2012). ‘Introduction: Policy-making, Learning and 
Devolution.’ Regional & Federal Studies, 22, (3), pp. 239-250. 
Keating, M., Cairney, P. & Hepburn, E. (2009). ‘Territorial Policy Communities and 
Devolution in the UK.’ Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 2, (1), 
pp.51-66. 
Keating, M., Cairney, P. & Hepburn, E. (2012). ‘Policy Convergence, Transfer and 
Learning in the UK under Devolution.’ Regional & Federal Studies, 22, (3), pp.289-
307.  
Knox, C. & Carmichael, P. (2010). ‘Debate: Devolution in Northern Ireland.’ Public 
Money & Management, 30, (2), pp.82-83. 
Knox, C. & Carmichael, P. (2015). ‘Local Government Reform: Community Planning 
and the Quality of Life in Northern Ireland.’ Journal of the Institute of Public 
Administration of Ireland, 63, (2), pp.31-57. 
Lineira, R. & Cetra, D. (2015). ‘The Independence Case in Comparative 
Perspective.’ The Political Quarterly, 82, (2) pp.257-264.  
Lynch, P. & Hopkins, S. (2001). ‘The British-Irish Council: Progress Frustrated.’ 
Regional Studies, 35, (8), pp.753-758. 
MacMillan, J. (2000). Scotland’s Shame. In T.M. Devine (Ed.), Scotland’s Shame? 
Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland. (pp. 13-24). Edinburgh: Mainstream 
Publishing Company Ltd. 
MacRaild, D.M. (2014). Emigration, 1800-1920. In: Jackson, A. (Ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Modern Irish History (pp.562-582). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mason, R. (2015). ‘Green Party held talks on alliance with SNP and Plaid Cymru- 
Caroline Lucas’. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com Last accessed 30/12/17. 
McCall, C. (2002). ‘Political Transformation and the Reinvention of the Ulster-Scots 
Identity and Culture.’ Identities, 9, (2), pp.197-218.  
McEvoy, J. (2006). ‘Elite Interviewing in a Divided Society: Lessons from Northern 
Ireland.’ Politics, 26, (3), pp.184-191. 
McGlynn, C. & McAuley, J.W. (2011). ‘Northern Ireland. Delivering Peace, Prosperity 
and Social Justice?’ In V. Bryson & P.Fisher (Eds.) Redefining Social Justice: New 
Labour Rhetoric and Reality. (pp.159-177). Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
 70 
 
McGlynn, C., Tonge, J. & McAuley, J.W.  (2014). ‘The Party Politics of Post-
Devolution Identity in Northern Ireland.’ The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 16, (2), pp.273-290. 
McKillop, A. (2014). ‘The Orange Order’s independence intervention might boost the 
yes vote’. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com. Last accessed 27/12/2017. 
McLean, I. (2000). ‘Getting and Spending. Can (or should) the Barnett Formula 
Survive?’ New Economy, 7, (2), pp.76-80. 
McLean, I. & McMillan, A. (2005). State of the Union: Unionism and the Alternatives 
in the United Kingdom since 1707. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
McLean, I., Gallagher, J., and Lodge, G. (2013) Scotland’s Choices: The 
Referendum and What Happens Afterwards. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
McNarry, D. Interview by Brook, J. (1.00pm, 6th July 2015).  
McVeigh, R. & Rolston, B. (2007). ‘From Good Friday to Good Relations: 
Sectarianism, racism and the Northern Ireland state.’ Race and Class, 48, (4), pp.1-
23. 
Midwinter, A. (2000). ‘The Barnett Formula. Why replacing it would be a Mistake.’ 
New Economy, 7, (2), pp.72-75. 
Mitchell, J. (1998). ‘What could a Scottish Parliament Do?’ Regional and Federal 
Studies, 8, (1), pp.68-85.   
Mitchell, J. (2000). ‘New Parliament, New Politics in Scotland.’ Parliamentary Affairs, 
53, pp.605-621. 
Mitchell, J. & Bradbury, J. (2004). ‘Devolution: Comparative Development and Policy 
Roles.’ Parliamentary Affairs, 57, (2), pp.329-346.  
Mooney, G., Scott, G. & Williams, C. (2006). ‘Introduction: Rethinking Social Policy 
Through Devolution.’ Critical Social Policy, 26, (3), pp.483-49. 
Mullen, T. (2014). ‘The Scottish Independence Referendum.’ Journal of Law and 
Society, 41, (4), pp.627-40. 
Mycock, A. (2012). ‘SNP, Identity and Citizenship: Re-imagining State and Nation.’ 
National Identities, 14, (1), pp.53-69. 
Nagle, J. (2013). ‘From Secessionist Mobilization to Sub-state Nationalism? 
Assessing the Impact of Consociationalism and Devolution on Irish Nationalism in 
Northern Ireland’. Regional and Federal Studies, 23, (4), pp.461-477. 
 71 
 
Nic Craith, M. (2001). ‘Politicised linguistic consciousness: the case of Ulster-Scots.’ 
Nations and Nationalism, 7, (1), pp.21-37.  
Nissen, S. (1998). ‘The Case of Case Studies: On the Methodological Discussion in 
Comparative Political Science’. Quality and Quantity, 32, (4), pp.399-418. 
Nolan, P. (2012) Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report Number One Available 
at: cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/nipmr_2012-02.pdf (accessed 29/04/17)  
Paterson, L. (2002). ‘Is Britain Disintegrating? Changing Views of ‘Britain’ after 
Devolution.’ Regional & Federal Studies, 12, (1), pp.21-42.  
Radford, K. (2001). ‘Creating an Ulster-Scots Revival.’ Peace Review, 13, (1), pp.51-
57.  
Reed, R. (2012). ‘Researching Ulster Loyalism: The Methodological Challenges of 
the Divisive and Sensitive Subject.’ Politics, 32, (3), pp.207-219. 
Robinson, O.C. (2014). ‘Sampling in Interview-based Qualitative Research: A 
Theoretical and Practical Guide.’ Qualitative Research in Psychology, 11, (1), pp.25-
41. 
Rosie, M. (2004). The Sectarian Myth in Scotland: Of Bitter Memory and Bigotry. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Ruane, C. Interview by Brook, J. (10.00am, 20th April 2015). 
Shaw, J., MacKinnon, D. & Docherty, I. (2009). ‘Divergence or Convergence? 
Devolution and Transport Policy in the United Kingdom.’ Government & Policy, 27,   
pp.546-567.   
Shirlow, P. (2001). ‘Devolution in Northern Ireland/Ulster/the North/Six Counties: 
Delete as Appropriate.’ Regional Studies, 35, pp.743-752. 
Shirlow, P. & McGovern, M. (Eds.)(1997). Who are ‘the People’? Unionism, 
Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland. London: Pluto Press.   
Southern, N. (2007). ‘Britishness, “Ulsterness” and Unionist Identity in Northern 
Ireland.’ Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 13, pp.71-102.  
Stapleton, K. & Wilson, J. (2004). ‘Ulster Scots Identity and Culture: The Missing 
Voices.’ Identities, 11, (4), pp.563-591. 
Stewart, A.T.Q. (1977). The Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster 1609-1969. London: 
Faber & Faber. 
 72 
 
Styles, S.C. (2000). The Non-Sectarian Culture of North-East Scotland. In 
T.M.Devine (Ed.), Scotland’s Shame? Bigotry and Sectarianism in Modern Scotland. 
(pp.115-123). Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company Ltd. 
Sugden, C. Interview by Brook, J. (11.00am, 27th July 2015).  
Swenden, W. & McEwen, N. (2014). ‘UK devolution in the shadow of hierarchy? 
Intergovernmental relations and party politics.’ Comparative European Politics, 12, 
(4/5), pp.488-509. 
Taylor, R. (Ed.) (2009). Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the 
Northern Ireland Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Todd, J. (2009). ‘Northern Ireland: From Multiphased Conflict to Multilevelled 
Settlement.’ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 15, (3/4), pp.336-354.   
Trench, A. (2005). ‘Intergovernmental relations in the UK: The pressures yet to 
come. In A. Trench (Ed.), The Dynamics of Devolution (pp.137-160). Exeter: Imprint 
Academic. 
Trench, A. (2014). ‘Devolution in the round: Can Britain continue to muddle through?’ 
Political Insight, pp.4-7.  
Walker, G. (1995). Intimate Strangers. Political and Cultural Interaction Between 
Scotland and Ulster in Modern Times. Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd.  
Walker, G. (2010). ‘Scotland, Northern Ireland and Devolution: Past and Present.’ 
Contemporary British History, 24, (2), pp.235-256. 
Walker, G. (2012). ‘Scotland’s Sectarian Problems: Irish Answers?’ The Political 
Quarterly, 83, (2), pp.374-383. 
Walls, P. & Williams, R. (2005). ‘Religious discrimination in Scotland: A rebuttal of 
Bruce et al.’s claim that sectarianism is a myth.’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28, (4), 
pp.759-767. 
Wells, J. Interview by Brook, J. (3.00pm, 21st April 2015). 
Wood, N. (2014). ‘Culture, identity and the unusual case of Scottish nationalism?’ In 
Sharp, J., Cumbers, A., Painter, J. & Wood, N. (Eds), Deciding whose future? 
Challenges and opportunities of the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014 for 
Scotland and beyond. Political Geography, 41, (pp.39-42). 
 
 
 
 73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
